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11. Essay 1
The literature shows that standard heterogeneous agents models struggle to replicate
the magnitude of the wealth inequality observed in the data. For example, the Gini co-
efficient of the wealth distribution generated in a baseline Aiyagari (1994) model is only
around 0.4, while the U.S. wealth gini coefficient is close to 0.8 (see Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull
(1997)). An important part of the puzzle is that the rich save more and spend less than
predicted by standard models, and consequently accumulate a large amount of wealth.
According to Alvaredo et al. (2013), the top 1% of households in the U.S. hold nearly one
third of the total wealth and the top 5% holds over half, an order of magnitude larger than
their counterparts generated in standard models.
Why is the wealth distribution so unequal? Why do rich people hold such a high amount
of wealth? An important existing explanation offered in the literature is from De Nardi
(2004), who emphasizes the role of bequests and intergenerational links. De Nardi (2004)
finds that the rich are much more likely to leave bequests to their children compared to
their poorer counterparts, even after accounting for the relative wealth between the two
groups. Based on this finding, she created a model incorporating bequests into the util-
ity function as a luxury good, and finds that this model is capable of accounting for the
high concentration of wealth in the data, and that bequeathing behaviors are important
in shaping the distribution of wealth. However, the De Nardi (2004) model assumes an
identical fertility rate among the population, and thus abstracts from the fact that the poor
tend to have more children than the rich, a dimension of heterogeneity we argue is relevant
for understanding the wealth distribution. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by
extending the De Nardi (2004) model to incorporate differential fertility choice among the
2population, and analyze the implication of differential fertility for the wealth distribution
through its interaction with the bequest mechanism.
Economists have long argued that there exists an inverse relationship between income
and fertility.1 For instance, Jones and Tertilt (2008) document a strong negative relation-
ship between income and fertility choice for all cohorts of women born between 1826 and
1960 in the U.S. census data. They estimate an overall income elasticity of fertility of about
-0.38. We argue that this significant fertility difference between the poor and the rich can
amplify the impact of bequests on wealth inequality, because not only do rich parents leave
a greater amount of bequests than their poorer counterparts, but the children of rich par-
ents have fewer siblings to share their bequests with relative to the children of poor parents.
To capture the interaction between differential fertility and bequests, and to assess its
quantitative importance for understanding the wealth distribution, we develop a general
equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with the “warm-glow” bequest motive
(similar to that used in De Nardi (2004)) and differential fertility. Using a version of our
model calibrated to the U.S. economy, we find that the fertility difference between the
rich and the poor increases the Gini coefficient of wealth by about 5%, driven especially
by about a one quarter increase in the wealth share of the top 1 %. This compares with
models in De Nardi (2004) where she showed that intergenerational inheritance of abil-
ity increases the Gini coefficient by 3% and bequest motive increases it by 10%. We also
quantify the importance of the bequest mechanism by showing that an alternative model
in which the bequest channel has been shut down results in a much lower Gini coefficient
of the wealth distribution, i.e., 0.68, compared to our benchmark value of 0.79. In addi-
tion, we find in our model that anticipated bequests crowd out life-cycle savings, which
1See De La Croix and Doepke (2003), De la Croix and Doepke (2004), among others.
3implies that intergenerational transfers can lead to less capital formulation. In sum, this
paper finds that pairing bequest motive with differential fertility is quantitatively impor-
tant for explaining the saving behaviors of the rich and the consequent high level of wealth
inequality.
1.1. Literature Review
Ever since heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models have been introduced to the
macroeconomics literature by Bewley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994), a surge in papers have
used this class of models to explain the causes and mechanisms behind wealth inequal-
ity. As surveyed by De Nardi (2015), there have been many variations of the heteroge-
neous agent model in which introduce various mechanisms to better match the magnitude
of wealth inequality observed in the data, such as preference heterogeneity (Krusell and
Smith (1998), Heer (2001), Suen (2014)), entrepreneurship (Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)),
high earnings risk for the top earners (Castaneda et al. (2003)), transmission of bequests
across generations (Knowles (1999), De Nardi (2004), and De Nardi and Yang (2016)), and
others. Among these, our paper relates to the literature espousing bequest transmission
across generations as a main mechanism behind wealth inequality.
The two papers in this literature closest to ours in spirit are De Nardi (2004) and Knowles
(1999). De Nardi (2004) uses a quantitative, general equilibrium, overlapping-generations
model in which bequests and ability link parents and children. The element in which our
papers differ is in our treatment of fertility. In De Nardi (2004), each agent has the same
number of children. In our model agents have a different number of children depending
on the income, impacting the results in interesting ways. Our model is also close in spirit
4to Knowles (1999), who uses a two period model to show the importance of fertility to in-
equality. In his model, there is no retirement period, which means savings that occur in
his model are solely for the purpose of bequests. In contrast, the agents in our model must
save for their own retirement on top of bequests. Therefore, our model captures the dy-
namic interaction between life-cycle savings and anticipated bequests. We show this inter-
action is quantitatively important for understanding the wealth distribution. In addition,
our model differs from Knowles (1999) in terms of the choice of the bequest motive. While
bequests are assumed to be motivated by altruism in the Knowles (1999) model, we adopt
the “warm-glow” bequest motive based on the empirical literature we will discuss below.
It is well-known in the literature that intergenerational transfers account for a large frac-
tion of wealth accumulation.2 However, the literature has been at odds as to how to model
bequest motives, specifically whether bequests are motivated by altruism. Altonji et al.
(1992) found that the division of consumption and income within a family are codepen-
dent, indication that perfect altruism does not apply to operative transfers. Other studies
show that an increase in parental resources coupled with a decrease in child consump-
tion does not lead to a corresponding increase in transfers (Altonji et al. (1997) and Cox
(1987)). Altonji et al. (1997) find a one dollar transfer from child to parent results in only
a 13 cent donation from parent to child, which should be the full dollar under perfect al-
truism. Wilhelm (1996) finds siblings generally receive equally divided inheritances, rather
than the size of the inheritance being dependent on relative income as perfect altruism
would predict.3 Based on these empirical findings, multiple recent papers have assumed
2For instance, see Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Gale and Scholz (1994), among others.
3Note that the nature of intergenerational links can be different in developing countries that feature differ-
ent institutions and less generous public insurance. For instance, ? find in the Chinese data that intergenera-
tional transfers are highly dependent on the financial and health states of parents, suggesting strong altruism
between parents and children.
5an alternative bequest motive: the warm-glow motive.4 That is, parents derive utility from
giving while not caring directly about the wellbeing of the recipient. In addition, motivated
by the highly skewed distribution of bequests, these papers incorporate leaving bequests
into the utility function as a luxury good, allowing for rich parents to value bequests rela-
tively more. Following the tradition in these papers, we also adopt the “warm-glow” motive
and assume bequests are a luxury good.
Our paper also relates to a growing number of papers that have shown that allowing for
transfer of ability and human capital across generations is also an important element for
understanding inequality. These studies include Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Knowles
(1999), De Nardi (2004), De Nardi and Yang (2016), and among others. Of special note, Lee
et al. (2015) find that parental education is positively related to their children’s earnings,
thereby creating a virtuous cycle for the wealthiest and a vicious cycle for the poorest.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and its
stationary equilibrium. In Section 3, we calibrate a benchmark model. In Section 4, we dis-
cuss the main quantitative results and provide further discussion in Section 5. We conclude
in Section 6.
2. The Model
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of agents who live for three
periods. In the first period, agents are not economically active, only incurring costs to their
parents. In the second period, they make consumption and labor supply decisions, and
save for retirement. In the final period, they receive bequests from their dying parents,
4See De Nardi (2004), De Nardi and Yang (2016), among others.
6consume some of their wealth and leave the remainder as bequests to their own children.
2.1. Consumer’s Problem
2.1.1. Period One
An individual makes no economic decisions in the first period, but imposes a time cost
on her parents. She inherits an ability level from her parents. An individual’s ability ψ
(effective units of labor representing human capital, luck or inherent ability) depends on
their parental ability ψp, and the log of ability is assumed to follow the AR(1) process,
log (ψ) = ρ log (ψp) + ψ
where
ψ ∼ N
(
0, σ2ψ
)
, i.i.d.
in which ρ is the intergenerational persistence of productivity. We discretize the AR(1)
into 11-state Markov chain using the method introduced in Tauchen (1986), and the corre-
sponding transition matrix we obtain is denoted by M [ψ,ψ′].
2.1.2. Period Two
Individuals in the second period differ along three dimensions: earning ability ψ, num-
ber of siblings np (or the parent’s fertility), and current wealth of their elderly parents xp.
In this period, they jointly choose current consumption and save for period three. In ad-
dition, they raise n number of children, which is assumed to be an exogenous function of
7their earning ability ψ, that is, n = n(ψ).5 Therefore, the value function of an individual in
period two can be specified as follows:
V2 (ψ, n
p, xp) = max
c,a
[
c1−σ
1− σ + βV3(x)
]
subject to
c+ a ≤ ψw(1− γn(ψ))
x = a+
bp(xp)
np
.
Here, the current utility flow is derived from consumption c according the CRRA form,
and β stands for the time discount factor. Agents are given a time allocation set to unity. In
the budget constraint, γ is the time cost per child per parent, and thus (1− γn(ψ)) simply
represents the amount of time available to be allocated to the labor force. This implies that
ψ(1−γn(ψ)) is the total amount of effective labor supplied, withw measuring the real wage
per effective unit of labor. Note that because child costs are delineated in time, higher earn-
ing parents will effectively be paying more for their children, as is expected and reflected
in the data. We also restrict a, the amount saved, to be strictly non-negative, thereby im-
posing imperfect capital market. In other words, agents cannot borrow to finance their
retirement.
The second constraint of the maximization problem describes how total amount of
wealth in the third period x is determined. It is the sum of life-cycle savings a, and the
share of bequests received from dying parents bp/np. Here, bp denotes the bequest left by
5We also analyze an extended model with endogenous fertility later to explore the sensitivity of our main
results to the assumption of exogenous fertility.
8the parent, which is a function of the parent’s total wealth xp at the beginning of the third
period. It is obtained from solving the utility maximization problem for the third period. It
is important to note that the bequest is shared by all children of the parent, and thus what
each child receives is negatively affected by the number of siblings she has. From the utility
maximization problem in Period 2, we obtain two policy functions: optimal consumption
C2 (ψ, n
p, xp) and optimal asset accumulation A(ψ, np, xp).
2.1.3. Period Three
Individuals retire in the third period and jointly choose current consumption and the
amount of bequests for her children. Their state in this period can be captured by a sin-
gle variable, x, the amount of wealth held, which is simply the sum of life-cycle savings
and the share of bequests received from their dying parents at the beginning of Period 3.
Individuals in Period 3 face the following utility-maximization problem:
V3(x) = max
c,b
[
c1−σ
1− σ + φ1 (b+ φ2)
1−σ
]
subject to
c+ b ≤ (1 + r)x,
where b is the total amount of bequests left for children in the next period. Here we fol-
low De Nardi (2004) and assume that parents have “warm glow” motive, where they enjoy
giving to their children but do not directly care about the children’s wellbeing, and in ad-
dition bequest is assumed to be a luxury good. As we reviewed in the introduction, this
assumption is consistent with sizable empirical evidence. The term φ1 measures the rela-
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events for Current Generation
tive weight placed on the bequest motive, while φ2 measures the extent to which bequests
are a luxury good. From this maximization problem, we obtain two policy functions: opti-
mal consumption C3(x) and optimal bequests B(x).
Figure 2 contains the timeline summing up the sequence of events that happen through-
out the lifecycle.
2.2. Firm’s Problem
Firms are identical and act competitively. Their production technology is Cobb-Douglas,
which combines aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L to produce output Y as follows
Y = zKθL1−θ
10
in which θ is the capital share and z is the total factor productivity (TFP).
The profit-maximizing behaviors of firms imply that
r = zθKθ−1L1−θ − δ
and
w = z(1− θ)KθL−θ,
where δ represents the capital depreciation rate.
2.3. Stationary Equilibrium
Let Φ2 and Φ3 represent the population distributions of individuals in period 2 and 3.
A steady state in this economy consists of a sequence of allocations [c2, c3, a, b], aggregate
inputs [K,L] and prices [w, r] such that
1. Given prices, the allocations [c2, c3, a, b] solve each individual’s utility maximization
problem
2. Given prices, aggregate capital and labor [K,L] solve the firm’s problem.
3. Markets clear:
K ′ =
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
[
A (ψ, np, xp) +
Bp (xp)
np
]
dΦ2 (ψ, n
p, xp)
L′ = n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
(1− γN ′(ψ, np, xp))ψdΦ2(ψ, np, xp)
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where n̂ is the average number of children the current period two individuals have.
4. The distributions Φ2 and Φ3 are stationary in the steady state and evolve according to
the following laws of motions:
Φ2
(
ψ′, np
′
, xp
′)
=
1
n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
I
xp′=A(ψ,np,xp)+ b
p(xp)
np
Inp′=n(ψ)M
[
ψ,ψ′
]
n(ψ)dΦ2 (ψ, n
p, xp)
Φ3(x
p′) =
1
n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
I
x=A(ψ,np,xp)+
bp(xp)
np
dΦ2(ψ, n
p, xp)
whereM [·] is the Markov transition matrix, I’s are the indicator functions. The ability
distribution in the next period depends on the current period young’s fertility. In the
third period, an individual’s wealth is what he has saved in the previous period, as
well as what he has received in bequests from his parents. Note that the distribution
of the elderly’s wealth holdings is identical to the distribution of the young’s parental
wealth holdings (i.e., x = xp
′
).
The rest of the paper focuses on stationary equilibrium analysis. Since analytical results
are not obtainable, numerical methods are used to solve the model.
3. Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the current U.S. economy, and the calibration strategy
we adopt here is the following. The values of some standard parameters are predetermined
based on previous studies, and the values of the rest of the parameters are then simultane-
ously chosen to match some key empirical moments in the U.S. economy.
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Table 1: The Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Source
z 1.0 Normalization
σ 1.5 Macro Literature
θ 0.36 Macro Literature
δ 0.04 Macro Literature
γ 0.2 Haveman and Wolfe (1995)
ρ 0.4 Solon (1992)
Parameter Value Moment to match
β 0.90 annual interest rate: 0.04
φ1 -0.33 bequest/wealth ratio: 0.31
φ2 0.086 pop. share with bequests < third of mean income
σ2ψ 1.15 Income Gini: 0.63
3.1. Demographics and Preferences
One period in our model is equivalent to 30 years. Individuals enter the economy when
they are 30 years old (Period 2). They retire at 60 years old (Period 3) and die at the end of
the third period (at 90 years old).
The parameter in CRRA utility, σ, is set to 1.5 based on the existing macro literature. The
subjective discount factor β is calibrated to match an annual interest rate of 0.04, which
gives us an annual discount factor of 0.90. We calibrate our bequest parameters to ensure
that the level and distribution of bequests generated from our benchmark model matches
their respective data counterparts. Specifically, φ1 is calibrated to match the aggregate be-
quest to wealth ratio: 0.31 according to the estimation by Gale and Scholz (1994). A positive
value of φ2 implies that bequests are luxury goods, and its value controls the skewness of
13
the bequests distribution. According to the empirical estimation by Hurd and Smith (2002),
about 90 % of the population do not receive a significant amount of bequests (i.e. less than
half of average lifetime income). Gale and Scholz (1994) report that 96% do not receive in-
heritances above 3 thousand. In the benchmark calibration, we calibrate the value of φ2 so
that 90% of agents in the benchmark model receive bequests that are less than a third of
median individual lifetime income.
We use the 1990 U.S. census data to calibrate the fertility choices for each group in
our benchmark model6. We follow the approach in ? and use the Children Ever Born to
a woman as the fertility measure. Specifically, we use the sample of currently married
women ages 40-50 (birth cohort 1940-50), and then organize the respondents into 11 ability
groups corresponding to our model distribution by Occupational Income, corrected for a
2% growth rate.7 We believe the propensity of death on childbirth during this time period is
low enough that the child mortality risk is not a significant issue. We take the mean fertility
rate for each group and assign it to the corresponding group of agents in our benchmark
model to generate the appropriate level of differential fertility by income.8 The resulting
fertility-income relationship from our calibration exercise is reported in Table 15, which is
consistent with the estimation results in ?. For instance, the income elasticity of fertility
is estimated to be -0.20 to -0.21 for the cohorts of women born between 1940 and 1950 in
?, while the implied income elasticity of fertility from our calibrated fertility distribution is
-0.22.
6Courtesy of Steven Ruggles, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. Inte-
grated Public Use Micro data Series: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015.
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0.
7Here we follow ? closely and use the husband’s occupational income to avoid the selection bias in women’s
employment status.
8Note that the fertility choice in our model is the per parent fertility so we follow the tradition in the fertility
literature and halve these fertility rates calculated from the data when using them in the model.
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3.2. Technology and Earning Ability
The capital share θ is set to 0.36, and the capital depreciation rate is set to 0.04. Both are
commonly used values in the macro literature. The value of TFP parameter, z, is normal-
ized to one.
We approximate the AR(1) process for earning ability ψ by an 11-state Markov chain
using the method introduced in Tauchen (1986). The coefficient of intergenerational per-
sistence, ρ, is set to 0.4 according to the estimates in Solon (1992). We calibrate the in-
come variance σ2ψ so that the income Gini coefficient generated from the model matches
the value of 0.63 that Castaneda et al. (2003) estimated using the 1992 Survey of Consumer
Finances data. We report the resulting ability levels in Table 15 and the corresponding tran-
sition matrix can be seen in Section ?? of the Appendix. In addition, we set the time cost of
children γ to be 0.2 of parental time per child based on the empirical estimates of Haveman
and Wolfe (1995).
The key parameter values and their sources are summarized in Table 13.
4. Quantitative Results
We start this section by reviewing the main properties of the benchmark model at the
steady state, with special attention given to its implications for wealth inequality. We then
run counter-factual computational experiments to highlight the impact of differential fer-
tility and bequests on wealth inequality.
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Table 2: Benchmark Model Statistics
Name Model Data
Annual Interest Rate 0.04 0.04
US Aggregate Bequest/Wealth Ratio 0.31 0.31
Average fertility rate per household 2.3 2.3
Gini Coefficient of the US Income Distribution 0.64 0.63
Income Elasticity of Fertility -0.22 -0.20/-0.21
4.1. Some Key Properties of the Benchmark Economy
A key element of our theory is the negative income-fertility relationship, which is best
measured by the income elasticity of fertility. As we mentioned previously, the income elas-
ticity of fertility implied by our benchmark model is very close to its empirical counterpart
estimated by ?. Another important part of our theory is the skewed distribution of bequests
with a long right tail. We ensure the model matches the bequest distribution we observe
in the data by modelling bequests as luxury goods in the fashion of De Nardi (2004) and
De Nardi and Yang (2016). In addition, our calibration strategy implies that our benchmark
model matches the bequest-capital ratio and the 90th percentile of bequest amount.
Table 14 contains some key statistics of the benchmark economy together with their
data counterparts. As can be seen, our calibrated benchmark model matches the key em-
pirical moments from the US economy fairly well. Table 15 summarizes the ability distri-
bution generated by our benchmark model, along with how the average fertility calculated
by ability groups match up against the data. The first row represents the relative value of
the ability ψi for Group i, in which the value for Group 6 is normalized to unity. The second
row is the share of the population whose ability is equal to or less than that group. Hence,
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Table 3: Fertility-Income Relationship from the Benchmark Model
Ability Group i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ψi 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.46 1.0 2.19 4.81 10.56 23.16 50.80
Cumulative Mass 0.004 0.015 0.064 0.185 0.383 0.617 0.815 0.937 0.985 0.996 1.0
Fertility per Parent 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.25 1.15 1.08 1.07 0.96 0.86 0.88
Group 11—the highest ability group in our model—corresponds to the top 0.4% and the
top two groups together correspond to the top 2% of the population.
4.2. Wealth Inequality in the Benchmark Economy
In this section, we examine the wealth distribution generated in our benchmark model.
We compute the proportion of overall wealth held by each percentile group in our bench-
mark model and compare it against the data. Some key statistics of the wealth distribution
are reported in Table 16.9 The richest 1% from our benchmark model hold less wealth than
the data, but overall our model does a moderately accurate job of matching the actual dis-
tribution of wealth in the U.S., especially among the top 20%. As can be seen in the last
column, our benchmark model also matches the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution
closely. It is important to note that these statistics of the wealth distribution are not used
as our targeted moments in the calibration.
The data comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which has an oversample of
wealthy families and a weighting scheme that corrects for under-coverage at the top of
the wealth distribution. This attempts to correct for the outsize role that non-respondents
among the very wealthy would play in creating a non-representative sample.
To understand the role of differential fertility and bequests in shaping the U.S. wealth
9A graphical distribution of wealth generated from our benchmark model can be seen in Figure ??.
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Table 4: Wealth Distribution: Model vs Data
Percentile < 60% 60−80 % > 80% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Data 0.08 0.13 0.79 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.78
Benchmark Model 0.05 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.79
Identical Fertility 0.07 0.16 0.77 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.75
Identical Fertility+No Bequest 0.11 0.18 0.71 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.68
Data source: Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)
inequality, in the rest of this section we conduct two counter-factual computational exper-
iments in which each of the two factors is assumed away respectively. In the first counter-
factual experiment, we impose identical fertility to show the effects of differential fertil-
ity on the distribution of wealth and bequests. In the second counter-factual experiment,
we eliminate the bequest motive to highlight the impact of bequests on wealth inequality.
From these two counter-factual experiments, two things become clear. We find that be-
quests significantly increase the level of wealth inequality, and fertility differences between
the rich and the poor amplify this effect, especially for the far right of the wealth distribu-
tion. In addition, we find that life-cycle saving and anticipated bequests interact with each
other, with expected bequests crowding out life-cycle saving for retirement. This inter-
action is quantitatively important for fully understanding wealth inequality in the United
States.
4.3. Counter-factual Experiment I: Identical Fertility
To highlight the important role of fertility differences across the income groups in am-
plifying the impact of bequests on wealth inequality, we consider a counter-factual exper-
iment in which fertility is assumed to be identical across the income distribution. That is,
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we force everyone in the model to have the same fertility choice, 1.15 per parent, and re-
calibrate the model using exactly the same strategy and the same empirical moments as in
the benchmark model.
The main results from this counter-factual experiment are also reported in Table 16. We
find that allowing for differential fertility can have important ramifications for the wealth
distribution, as evidenced by the Gini coefficient of wealth distribution, and the share of
wealth held by the top 1% respectively increasing by around 4% and by about a quarter.
The reason why the counter-factual model with identical fertility performs worse than
the benchmark model with differential fertility can be best understood when we analyze
the distribution of bequests generated from the two models. Table 5 highlights the differ-
ences. In the benchmark model, we obtain a extremely skewed distribution of bequests
in which the top 1 % are responsible for 43% of total bequests at the steady state. In fact,
the top 10 % are responsible for almost all the bequests. As a result, the Gini coefficient is
very high at 0.96. In contrast, the counter-factual model with identical fertility obtains a
lower value of Gini coefficient of 0.90. This decrease mainly results from the fact that the
share of total bequests from the top 1% and the top 5% drop significantly. We argue that
this change in the distribution of bequests is an important reason why the counter-factual
model generates a lower wealth inequality. The intuition behind this result is the follow-
ing. When children are receiving their bequests, poor children have more siblings and rich
children have fewer siblings relative to the identical fertility case. This leads to less division
of estates than would otherwise be the case for the richest groups, causing increased con-
centration of wealth at the highest income levels and greater diffusion at the lower income
levels.10
10The reason the rich have fewer children than the poor is a question that remains without a definitive an-
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Table 5: Bequest Distribution: Benchmark vs. Identical Fertility
Percentile < 90% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark <0.01 0.09 0.48 0.43 0.96
Identical Fertility 0.12 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.90
It is also interesting to examine the life-cycle saving behaviors in the two versions of
the model. We find that life-cycle saving and anticipated bequests interact with each other,
which is important for understanding the wealth distribution. That is, anticipated bequests
have a crowding out effect on life-cycle saving. As shown in Table 6, the Gini coefficient for
the distribution of life-cycle saving from the benchmark model is 0.72 and the top 20%
account for 0.74 of the savings, which is lower than that from the counter-factual model
with identical fertility. On the surface, this result is puzzling because you would expect the
rich from the counter-factual model to be saving less than the rich from the benchmark
model. That is, the rich in this counter-factual economy are forced to have more children
than otherwise they would have, therefore they spend more time raising children and re-
ceive less labor income than in the benchmark model. Assuming the same saving rates in
the two models, the life-cycle saving distribution should be less unequal in the model with
identical fertility.
The reason why the distribution of life-cycle saving becomes more unequal after shut-
ting down differential fertility is because of the interaction between anticipated bequests
and life-cycle saving. In other words, the more unequal life-cycle saving distribution seen
in the identical fertility model is simply the endogenous response to the less unequal dis-
tribution of bequests in this counter-factual model. Given that the wealth distribution is
swer in the literature. Please see ? for a complete literature review on this topic.
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Table 6: Distribution of Life-Cycle Saving
Percentile < 60% 60−80 % > 80% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark Model 0.10 0.16 0.74 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.72
Identical Fertility 0.09 0.15 0.76 0.15 0.26 0.17 0.73
jointly determined by the distributions of life-cycle saving and bequests, the crowding out
effect from anticipated bequests on life-cycle saving weakens the impact of bequests on
wealth inequality. In the next section, we provide further discussion of this effect together
with some empirical evidence on the relationship between life-cycle saving and antici-
pated bequests.
4.4. Counter-factual Experiment II: Alternative Bequests
To highlight the role of bequests on wealth inequality, we now consider several counter-
factual experiments in which we alter the bequest motive. In other words, we create a
new counterfactual economy by changing the bequest motive in the first counterfactual
economy. This allows us to parse out the effects of fertility and bequests. We will be running
three counter factuals. Each will analyze the affect that our bequest function has on our
untargeted wealth distribution, in order to see the importance of our functional form in
our results.
The first will no longer have the bequest motive represented by a luxury good-instead it
will be treated as a normal good. Computationally, we set φ2 equal to null, and recalibrate
φ1 to match only the bequest capital ratio, and ignore the targeted 90th percentile of the
bequest distribution. We would expect this to reduce bequest inequality, and therefore
make the distribution of wealth more equal.
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The second and third eliminate the bequest motive altogether, one with differential fer-
tility, and one with identical fertility. Computationally, we set φ1 equal to null, which means
no bequests ever take place at the steady state, and recalibrate the rest of the parameters in
the same way as in the benchmark model. The reason we are running this model twice is to
isolate the effect of fertility on labor market contributions, which gives us an idea how im-
portant that channel is in our benchmark model for generating the high degree of wealth
inequality.
Results from these experiments are shown in Table 7.
The elimination of the luxury good element from the benchmark model does in fact
reduce inequality, especially among the top 1%. As the middle class increases their be-
questing, wealth in the economy becomes less concentrated. We conclude that the luxury
good assumption is critical for the high degree of inequality we generate in the benchmark
model. The model with bequests that are not luxury good generates a wealth distribution
almost identical to a model without bequests.
Comparing the model with Identical Fertility and No Bequest to the model with Differ-
ential Fertility and No Bequest, we can see the impact of fertility on the time spent in the
labor force. Furthermore, comparing the model with Differential Fertility and No Bequest
to the Benchmark model allows us to find the impact on wealth distribution from the di-
vision of estates between children. Using this deconstruction, we conclude that the estate
division is more important in our model for generating a high degree of wealth inequality.
Specifically, including the estate division channel increases wealth holdings of the top 1%
by about a quarter, and increases the Gini coefficient by about a tenth. This compares to
our time cost channel generating an increase in the Gini coefficient of about 6%.
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Table 7: Wealth Distribution: Benchmark vs No Bequests
Percentile < 60% 60−80 % > 80% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark Model 0.05 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.79
Differential Fertility + No Luxury 0.09 0.17 0.74 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.72
Differential Fertility + No Bequest 0.09 0.17 0.75 0.16 0.24 0.15 0.72
Identical Fertility + No Bequest 0.11 0.18 0.71 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.68
Data source: Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)
5. Further Discussion
5.1. An Extended Model with Endogenous Fertility
We assume that fertility choices are exogenous in our benchmark model. This assump-
tion significantly simplifies our analysis, and helps us avoid the complicated theoretical
issues that arose in the literature on the negative income-fertility relationship (see ? for a
complete review of this literature). In this section, we consider an extended version of the
model to assess the sensitivity of our main results with regard to this assumption.
In this extended model, we endogenize the fertility choices by simply assuming that
the number of children directly enters into agents’ utility function. Specifically, the second
period problem facing agents becomes:
V2 (ψ, n
p, xp) = max
c,a,n≥0
[
c1−σ
1− σ + λ1n
λ2 + β [V3(x)]
]
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Table 8: Income-Fertility Relationship in the Endogenous Fertility Model
Ability Group i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ψi 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.46 1.0 2.19 4.81 10.56 23.16 50.80
Cumulative Mass 0.004 0.015 0.064 0.185 0.383 0.617 0.815 0.937 0.985 0.996 1.0
Fertility per Parent 1.62 1.40 1.35 1.35 1.24 1.15 1.15 1.07 0.95 0.85 0.85
subject to
c+ a ≤ ψw(1− γn)
x = a+
B (xp)
np
Here agents derive utility from both current consumption c and the number of children
they choose to have, n. λ1 is the relative weight on the utility derived from children, and λ2
controls the curvature of the utility from children.
To generate the negative income-fertility relationship observed in the data, we have to
use a σ ∈ [0, 1]. Specifically, we set the value of σ to be 0.9. We calibrate the values of λ1 and
λ2 to match the following two moments: the average fertility rate and the income elasticity
of fertility. We calibrate the other parameters using the same moments as in the bench-
mark model. The fertility rates by each ability group are shown in Table 8. Our calibrated
parameters are shown in Table 9.
The wealth distribution from the extended model is shown in Table 10. As can be seen,
the main results remain very similar to those in our benchmark model, showing that our
results are robust to the assumption of exogenous fertility.
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Table 9: The Calibration of the Endogenous Fertility Model
Parameter Value Source
σ 0.9 Model Specification
β 0.92 annual interest rate: 0.04
φ1 2.9 bequest/wealth ratio: 0.31
φ2 0.07 pop. share with bequests (< half of income)
λ1 0.712 Average Fertility Rate: 2.3
λ2 0.369 Income-Fertility Elasticity: -0.21
σ2ψ 1.15 Income Gini: 0.63
Table 10: Wealth Distribution: Benchmark vs. Endogenous Fertility
Percentile < 60% 60−80 % > 80% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark Model 0.05 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.79
Endogenous Fertility 0.05 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.79
5.2. Relationship between Savings and Anticipated Bequests
A key implication of our model is that anticipated bequests have a crowding out effect
on life-cycle saving, and thus there should exist a negative correlation between saving and
expected bequests. In this section, we empirically test this implication. Specifically, we use
the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance dataset to estimate the cross-sectional relationship
between savings and expected bequest.
The Survey of Consumer Finance data has information on both saving and anticipated
bequests. For instance, it has a question asking how much they expect to receive from a
substantial inheritance or transfer of assets in the future from their parents, and it has a
question that asks how much they should have saved. We make use of the information
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Table 11: SCF Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
β1 −.023∗∗∗ −.028∗ -.034 -.035 -.023 -.028 -.033 -.035
S.E. (.008) (.015) (.027) (.045) (.060) (.077) (.087) (.159)
Bootstrapped S.E. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample full top 30% top 10% top 5% full top 30% top 10% top 5%
***-Significant at the 1% level
captured by these questions and consider the following regression specification:
ai = β1E [bi] + βqχiq + i (1)
where ai is the individual i’s optimal amount of savings, and E [bi] represents the expected
bequests to be received in the future. In the regression, we also control for age, partners age,
mother’s age, partner’s mother’s age (second order polynomials), liquid assets, retirement
accounts (IRAs, Pensions, etc), saving accounts, bonds, equity, total income (adjusted if
an ”abnormal year”), received inheritance in the past, race and education. These control
variables are represented by the vector χiq.
Regression results estimating Equation (1) are shown in Table 11. Specification (1-4) of
Table 11 is a basic OLS. Specification (5-8) uses a bootstrapping standard error technique
with a correction for multiple imputation on our entire sample. Specifications (2-4) and
(6-8) run on a subsample of top 30%, 10% and top 5% of the income distribution. The
reason why we restrict ourselves to these subsamples is because almost all the bequests
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observed in both the data and in our model occur within these subsamples. Even when the
standard error is calculated correctly via bootstrapping, the point estimate is unchanged
even though the statistical significance goes away. Overall, we document a fairly consistent
negative correlation between savings and expected bequests, which corroborates what we
found from our model.
6. Conclusion
This paper pursued two goals. First, to build and run a simple overlapping generations
model including differential fertility and intergenerational transfers. We did this using a
three period model with childhood, adulthood and retirement, where individuals evinced
differential fertility and gave bequests to their children. Second, to match the wealth-
income inequality disparity seen in the data, where wealth inequality is higher than in-
come inequality. Although the wealth held by the top 1% from our model does not com-
pletely match the data, we come very close and match various other important moments.
Overall, our results show that allowing differential fertility is crucial in explaining the dis-
parity between the income and wealth inequality. In other words, we show that ignoring
the fertility differences between the rich and the poor can only result in an incomplete pic-
ture of inequality. In addition, we find that expected bequests have a crowding out effect
on life-cycle savings, which can be quantitatively important for understanding the wealth
distribution.
We conclude the paper by drawing attention to a few potentially important issues from
which this paper has abstracted. For instance, we have abstracted from government. This
modelling strategy simplifies our analysis, and allows us to focus on the amplification effect
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of differential fertility on the wealth distribution. However, government programs (such as
Social Security) and fiscal policies would definitely have interesting distributional effects
as well. In particular, these effect may interact with differential fertility and bequests. In
addition, we do not model the human capital investment in children, and thus do not cap-
ture the well-known quality-quantity tradeoff of children facing parents. We leave them for
future research.
7. Essay 2
This paper finds the quantitative wealth effects of adjusting or eliminating the estate tax
in the United States. It also estimates the potential impact of switching from an estate tax
regime to an inheritance tax regime. This paper’s unique contribution is to examine these
options in an environment of a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model with
differential fertility, using the wedge of fertility disparity between high- and low-earning
individuals to more accurately capture the reality of intergenerational transfers.
Recent U.S. data shows large increases in the concentration of wealth over the past 3
decades. For instance, the top 1 percent holds nearly 1/3 of the total wealth in the econ-
omy, and that share is growing according to Alvaredo et al. (2013). The top 5 percent holds
over 1/2 of the wealth. This trend has accelerated in the years since the 2008 financial crisis
(Saez and Zucman (2016)). In addition, wealth inequality is significantly higher than labor
earnings or total income inequality. In 1995, the Gini coefficient for annual labor earnings
was 0.63. The Gini for wealth holding was much higher, at 0.8 (Rodriguez et al. (2002)). Un-
derstanding the causes for this relatively greater level of wealth inequality is important for
the economic consequences faced by highly unequal economies, such as greater societal
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unrest and lower intergenerational mobility.
Why is wealth inequality more pronounced than income inequality? This is a major
puzzle surrounding the broader issues of inequality. Wealthy individuals act in a different
way than traditional economic models would predict, relatively saving more and spending
less, even as they reach the end of their lifespans (Dynan et al. (2004)). In addition to this,
wealthier people are much more likely to give bequests to their children at the end of their
lives, even when accounting for relative wealth. Standard dynamic models with heteroge-
neous agents have difficulty replicating this savings behavior. For instance, Aiyagari (1994)
predicts in a calibrated simulation the top 1 percent will hold 4 percent of the wealth, while
empirically the top 1 percent holds 30 percent. Why do the wealthiest people choose to
possess such a high level of wealth instead of increasing their consumption?
One potential explanation for this behavior is a bequest motive, especially since inter-
generational transfer is a significant flow of wealth. Historically, the amount of wealth de-
rived from intergenerational transfer has varied between 1/10 and 1/5 (Modigliani (1988)),
however, more recent estimates place it as high as 1/2 (Gale and Scholz (1994)). The be-
quest flow is highly unequal. The top 2% of households receive nearly 70% of lifetime in-
heritances (Hendricks (2001)).
Economists have argued there exists an inverse relationship between income and fer-
tility.11 For instance, Jones and Tertilt (2007) document a strong negative relationship be-
tween income and fertility choice for all cohorts of women born between 1826 and 1960 in
the U.S. census data. They estimate an overall income elasticity of fertility for this time pe-
riod of -0.38. I argue that this significant fertility difference between low and high earners
11See De La Croix and Doepke (2003), De la Croix and Doepke (2004), Jones and Tertilt (2007), Zhao (2011),
Zhao (2014), Cooke et al. (2017), among others.
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can amplify the impact of bequests on wealth inequality, because not only do rich par-
ents leave a greater amount of bequests than their poorer counterparts, but the children
of richer parents tend to have fewer siblings to share their bequests with relative to the
children of poorer parents.
If higher-earning couples have fewer children, as is consistently reported in the liter-
ature (Jones and Tertilt (2007)), this could significantly impact how transfer taxes are real-
ized, and raises questions about which tax regime is most equitable and efficient. Transfers
occurring at death may be taxed in the form of estate taxation, i.e. the tax may be imposed
on the total amount of wealth left by the decedent. The taxes may instead take the form
of an inheritance tax, in which case the base is defined on the level of the recipient, and
reflects the transfers to that particular individual (Kopczuk et al. (2010)). Both forms of
taxation usually have a supplemental gift taxation to ensure the tax is not simply avoided
by a transfer given prior to the time of death. In the U.S. the gift and estate tax has been
integrated since the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The structure of the estate tax can lead to strange distortions in the progressivity of the
tax burden. Batchelder and Khitatrakun (2008) estimate that about 22% of heirs burdened
by the U.S. estate tax have inherited less than $500,000, while 21% of heirs who inherit more
than $2,500,000 bear no estate tax burden. The quantity of heirs thus has a large impact on
the distributional effect if the tax is progressive, as it almost always is. Many U.S. states and
countries currently use an inheritance tax, such as Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Japan, France, U.K., South Korea and Germany. Understanding
the impact switching from a federal estate tax to a federal inheritance tax could have on the
United States wealth distribution is an understudied element of U.S. tax policy.
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The role played in increasing wealth inequality by reductions in the estate tax over the
past few decades remains contentious, and this paper will offer a quantifiable estimate as
to the results of rate and exemption changes on the distribution of wealth. According to
the Internal Revenue Service, in the past 17 years the top rate has fallen from 55% to 40%,
and the exemption level has risen from 675,000 to 11 million for individuals. The number
of taxable estates declined nearly 90 %, from 51,736 in 2001 to 5,219 in 2016, primarily due
to the increases in the filing threshold (IRS SOI Tax Statistics). Clearly these changes are
nontrivial and bear analysis. In addition, as the baby boomer generation begins to pass
away, wealth transfers are expected to increase. Estimated transfers total between $40 and
$135 trillion over the next half century according to Havens and Schervish (1999).
This paper will do the following. First, build and run an overlapping generations model
that includes differential fertility, intergenerational transfers, and a comprehensive estate
tax regime. Second, to scrutinize the impact changing rates and exemption levels would
have on wealth inequality in a steady state analysis. Third, altering the model to switch to
an inheritance tax and analyzing the results such a change would have on the distribution
of wealth.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the existing literature.
In section 3, I describe the model and its stationary equilibrium. In section 4, I calibrate
a benchmark specification using moment matching. In section 5, I discuss the results. In
section 6, I use alternative formulation to answer the core questions of the paper. The final
section concludes.
8. Literature Review
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8.1. Inequality and Bequests
Inequality and its causes have become a political and economic touchstone in recent
years. However, defining what dimension of inequality is being considered is often left un-
said by the bumper stickers. There exists unequal distributions of productivity, income,
wealth, consumption, bequests, shocks, choices, etc. Some of these elements, especially
income and wealth, are treated as if they are equivalent. But the data shows large differ-
ences in the distributions of income and wealth in the United States. As found by Diaz-
Gimenez et al. (1997), the correlations between earnings and wealth and between income
and wealth are surprisingly low: 0.230 and 0.321, respectively.
In 1992 the United States’ Gini indexes for short-term labor earnings, income, and wealth
were respectively .63, .57, and .78 (Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)), while in 1995 they were .61,
.55 and .80 (Rodriguez et al. (2002)). The shares of earnings and wealth of the households
in the top 1 percent of the corresponding distributions are 15 percent and 30 percent, re-
spectively ( Castaneda et al. (2003)).
Standard quantitative macroeconomic models have had difficulties in generating the
observed degree of wealth concentration (De Nardi and Yang (2016)). Specifically, these
models fail to account for the extremely long and thin top tails of the distributions and for
the large number of households in their bottom tails (Castaneda et al. (2003), Quadrini and
Rı´os-Rull (1997)). However, if it is intergenerational transmission of wealth and ability that
drives wealth inequality, as Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) have argued, then a myopic focus
on life-cycle saving will fail to capture the relevant causes of wealth inequality. Overlapping
generations show an improvement at mimicking the data. Using an OLG model,Huggett
(1996) predicts that the top 1 % will hold 7% of the wealth. This model only accounted for
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accidental bequests, distributed equally to all individuals.
There have been multiple papers arguing that bequest giving is crucial to explaining
wealth differentials. Most recently, De Nardi (2004), De Nardi and Yang (2016) and Cooke
et al. (2017) incorporate bequest leaving into the utility function as a luxury good, allowing
for rich parents to value bequests more. If bequests are a luxury good such that the rich
gain greater utility from leaving them, then bequests will play an outsize role in generating
wealth inequality. This is due to the emergence of large estates, or dynasties, where wealthy
parents have well-educated, highly productive children to whom they leave large bequests.
These persistent rich often have smaller families than the median, leading to greater rela-
tive concentration. This is consistent with Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010); smaller cohorts
receive relatively large per child transfers from parents.
Bequests represent a large piece of intergenerational transfers. Gale and Scholz (1994)
use the Survey of Consumer Finances to find the amount of inter-vivos transfers and inher-
itance from 1983-85. Between support given, college expenses paid, and inheritance given,
the amount totaled over $350 billion. Of this, inheritance was nearly 40 % and over 60 %
of those who reported receiving inheritance were in the top decile of wealth. Their cen-
tral estimate is that intended life-time transfers (which they define as inter-vivos transfers,
trust accumulations, and life insurance payments to children) account for at least 20 % of
aggregate net worth, and bequests, accidental or intended, account for 31 percent more.
Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) find that 3/4 of the elderly single population has a bequest
motive and about 4/5 of their net wealth will be bequeathed, half of which is due to a be-
quest motive as opposed to accidental bequests. This ratio is consistent with Lee and Tan
(2017) and Hendricks (2001).
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There are six widely discussed motivations in the economic literature surrounding in-
tergenerational transfers (Batchelder (2009)). The first is an overabundance of precaution-
ary savings, leading to accidental bequests. The second is commonly known as ”money in
the utility function”: the wealth of an individual directly impacts her utility function, and
therefore she will have a positive balance at the time of death. The third is ”warm glow”:
the individual likes the idea of giving to their heirs, but the actual status of those heirs, or
how much that transfer is taxed, is unimportant. The fourth is the same as the third, but
the individual only gets utility from the warm glow giving post-taxation. The fifth is direct
altruism, and the sixth is a strategic motivation, given for some compensatory action like
old age care or social insurance. For computational ease, this paper will focus on the third
motivation, following De Nardi and Yang (2016).
8.2. Taxation
Taxes on wealth transfer have been a common theme throughout human history. Early
examples include 7th century B.C. Egypt and 1st century A.D. Rome. The first American
wealth transfer tax dates from 1797. This was a simple stamp levy on receipts for legacies
and wills. Since then, multiple inheritance taxes have been put into place as short term
funding mechanisms, usually for wars (Kopczuk (2013)). The modern day incarnation of
the estate tax dates from 1916, and is much more complex and wide-ranging. Today, nearly
every member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has some
form of estate or inheritance tax (Gale and Slemrod (2001)).
Despite this ubiquity, there is substantial debate around both the size of this tax and
whether it should exist at all. Opponents decry the morbidness of taxing corpses and
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the unfairness of ”double taxation,” as the recently deceased already paid taxes on their
income before giving it to their inheritors. Conversely, supporters, ranging from liberals
to libertarians, call large inheritances ”affirmative action for the wealthy” (Stelzer (1997)).
Transfer taxes have several unique properties (Kopczuk (2013)). First, the transfer may be
generating positive externalities. For example, if the transfer is intentional, the giver will
be generating utility (whether from warm-glow, altruism, or some other motivation), while
the recipient is gaining greater income to finance their own utility-enhancing choices. Sec-
ond it is infrequent, ofttimes occurring just once, at time of death. Finally, it only affects a
small, wealthy subset of the population.
Stiglitz (1978) raises a major concern with the estate taxes effect on the economy. If the
estate tax lowers savings, this will lead to a reduction in the capital stock and the marginal
product of labor. In short, abolition of the estate tax could raise wages and lead to an im-
provement in welfare. Laitner and Juster (1996) find that Stiglitz is correct, and a lower-
ing or removal of the tax on bequests would raise savings. However it would also increase
wealth inequality, specifically among the top 1 % of the distribution who are most affected
by the estate tax. This also does not take into account the finding in Cooke et al. (2017),
that expected inheritances reduce savings among beneficiaries by around 3%.
Concern that estate taxes unfairly impact small business and farms has led to provi-
sions allowing transfers of closely held businesses to value themselves at use value rather
than the higher market value. They can also spread their tax burden across many years. In
addition, the amount of small businesses affected by the estate tax is small. Farm assets
and real estate were just 1.7 % of taxable estate value in 2000 according to the Internal Rev-
enue Service. Limited Partnership and ”other noncorporate business assets” were 2.6 %.
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Even generous estimates of the definition of a small business results in them being about
1/10 of the total wealth transfer affected by the tax (Gale and Slemrod (2001)).
The last decade has seen major changes in the estate tax, with the basic exclusion
amount rising from 675,000 in 2001 to 5.5 million in 2016 and 11 million in 2018. The top
bracket tax rates also saw major changes, decreasing from 55 % in 2001 to 35 % in 2010, and
then increasing to 40 % in 2013, according to the IRS. Understanding the mechanisms and
effects of this tax policy is therefore very important.
9. Model
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of agents who live three
periods. In the first period individuals are children who are not economically active. In the
second period they make labor supply decisions, have children and save for retirement. In
the final period they receive bequests from their parents, consume some of their wealth,
and leave the remainder as bequests to their children in the next period. These bequests
are taxed, and the tax is distributed equally among that cadre of children. This allows the
estate tax to redistribute wealth within but not across generations.
9.1. Consumer’s Problem
9.1.1. Period One
An individual makes no economic decisions in the first period, but imposes a time cost
on her parents. She inherits an ability level from her parents. An individual’s ability ψ
(effective units of labor representing human capital, luck or inherent ability) depends on
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their parental ability ψp, and the log of ability is assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
log (ψ) = ρ log (ψp) + ψ
where
ψ ∼ N
(
0, σ2ψ
)
, i.i.d.
in which ρ is the intergenerational persistence of productivity. I discretize this into an 11-
state Markov chain using the method introduced in Tauchen (1986), and the corresponding
transition matrix I obtain is denoted by M [ψ,ψ′].
9.2. Period Two
Individuals in the second period differ along three dimensions: earning ability ψ, num-
ber of siblings np (or their parent’s fertility), and current wealth of their retired parents xp.
In this period, they jointly choose current consumption and save for period three. In addi-
tion, they have n children, which is determined as a function of their ability level, and have
to reduce their labor market allocation as a result of this allocation. Therefore, the value
function of an individual in period two can be specified as follows:
V2 (ψ, n
p, xp) = max
c,a≥0
[
c1−σ
1− σ + β [V3(x)]
]
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subject to
c+ a ≤ ψw(1− γn)
x = a+
Bp(xp)
np
− T (Bp(xp), τ, χ, κ) + g
n = N(ψ)
The individual can calculate an expected bequest value as a function of parental wealth
and the number of siblings in the next period, Bp(xp))/np, where Bp(xp) is the policy func-
tion for optimal amount of bequests given, dependent on wealth. Thus the total wealth the
individual possesses going into period 3 is x = a+Bp(xp)/np − T (·) + g, where a is the life-
cycle saving from period 2 to period 3 and n is number of children. T (·) is a tax payment
on intergenerational transfers and g is a governmental lump sum transfer payment, the
equally divided share of all taxes. The tax payment size depends on the size of the transfer
bing taxed, Bp(xp), the tax rate τ , the exemption level χ and the structure of the tax κ. In
this model the structure can take the form of an estate or an inheritance tax.
9.2.1. Period Three
Individuals retire in the third period and jointly choose current consumption and the
amount of bequests for their children. Their state in this period can be captured by a sin-
gle variable, x, the amount of wealth held, which is simply the sum of life-cycle savings,
the governmental transfer and the share of bequests received from their dying parents at
the beginning of Period 3. Individuals in Period 3 face the following utility-maximization
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Figure 2: Sequence of Events for Current Generation
problem:
V3(x) = max
c,b
[
c1−σ
1− σ + φ1 (b+ φ2)
1−σ
]
subject to
c+ b ≤ (1 + r)x,
where b is the total amount of bequests left for children in the next period. Here I follow
De Nardi (2004) and assume that parents have “warm glow” motive, where they enjoy giv-
ing to their children but do not directly care about the children’s wellbeing, and the bequest
is assumed to be a luxury good. The term φ1 measures the relative weight placed on the be-
quest motive, while φ2 measures the extent to which bequests are a luxury good. From this
maximization problem, I obtain two policy functions: optimal consumptionC3(x) and op-
timal bequests B(x).
Figure 2 contains the timeline summing up the sequence of events that happen through-
out the lifecycle.
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9.3. Firm’s Problem
Firms are identical and act competitively. Their production technology is Cobb-Douglas,
which combines aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L to produce output Y as follows
Y = zKθL1−θ
in which θ is the capital share and z is the total factor productivity (TFP).
The profit-maximizing behaviors of firms imply:
r = zθKθ−1L1−θ − δ
and
w = z(1− θ)KθL−θ,
where δ represents the capital depreciation rate.
9.4. Government and Taxes
The government runs a balanced budget every time period. They levy taxes either
on the estates of the deceased before distribution, or on the heirs directly, depending on
whether it is an estate or inheritance tax.
Let Φ2 represent the population distribution of individuals in period 2.
If there is an estate tax:
G =
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
[(Bp (xp)− χ)(τ)] dΦ2 (ψ, np, xp) ∀Bp (xp) > χ
40
and if there is an inheritance tax:
G =
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
[
(
Bp (xp)
np
− χ)(τ)
]
dΦ2 (ψ, n
p, xp) ∀Bp (xp) /np > χ
and the individual payment g will be the equal distribution of all tax revenue.
g =
G∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp Φ2 (ψ, n
p, xp)
In the benchmark model, the estate tax has a rate τ and an exemption level χ. All be-
quests below the exemption level are immune from taxation, all bequests above that level
are taxed at a fixed rate on the amount above the exemption level.
This payment is distributed to the same generation that would have received the inher-
itance.
9.5. A simple comparison of the estate and inheritance tax
Consider a simple economy with 3 families: A, B and C. Family A has one child, family
B has 2 children and family C has 3 children. In this economy there is an estate tax, with a
rate and exemption level. In this example we will set both to 0.5. Each family’s parents die,
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Table 12: A simple example of the estate and inheritance taxes
Type Rate Exemption A1 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 Total Tax
Estate 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.375 0.375 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75
Inheritance 0.5 0.25 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.75
leaving their children their remaining wealth, which is equal to 1 for all 3 families.
In this situation, all 3 families will pay the same amount in taxes, 0.25, and the remain-
der will be distributed to the children. So the child from family A will receive 0.75, the
children in family B will receive 0.375 each and the children in family C will receive 0.25
each. The total government receipts amount to 0.75.
Let us now assume the tax regime switches to an inheritance tax with no changes to the
rate or exemption level. Family A’s tax burden will remain the same, but family B and C will
pay no taxes because each child’s share falls below the exemption level.
Then let us lower the exemption level to 0.25 so that the government receives the same
amount of revenue. Now family A’s only child is paying 0.375 in taxes and keeping 0.625,
family B’s 2 children are paying 0.125 each and keeping 0.375 and family C’s 3 children are
paying 0.04 each and keeping 0.29.
It is clear that the estate tax favors families with fewer children, which as we know are
associated with higher-earning families.
9.6. Stationary Equilibrium
Let Φ2 and Φ3 represent the population distributions of individuals in period 2 and 3.
A steady state in this economy consists of a sequence of allocations [c2, c3, a, b], aggregate
inputs [K,L] and prices [w, r] such that
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1. Given prices, the allocations [c2, c3, a, b] solve each individual’s utility maximization
problem
2. Given prices, aggregate capital and labor [K,L] solve the firm’s problem.
3. The Government’s budget is balanced, g =
G
Φ2 (ψ, np, xp)
4. Markets clear:
K ′ =
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
[
A (ψ, np, xp) +
Bp (xp)− τ(Bp (xp)− χ)
np
]
dΦ2 (ψ, n
p, xp)
L′ = n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
(1− γN ′(ψ, np, xp))ψdΦ2(ψ, np, xp)
where n̂ is the average number of children the current period two individuals have to
account for population growth.
5. The distributions Φ2 and Φ3 are stationary in the steady state and evolve according to
the following laws of motions:
Φ2
(
ψ′, np
′
, xp
′)
=
1
n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
I
xp′=A(ψ,np,xp)+ b
p(xp)
np
Inp′=n(ψ)M
[
ψ,ψ′
]
n(ψ)dΦ2 (ψ, n
p, xp)
Φ3(x
p′) =
1
n̂
∫
ψ
∫
np
∫
xp
I
x=A(ψ,np,xp)+
bp(xp)
np
dΦ2(ψ, n
p, xp)
where M [·] is the Markov transition matrix, I’s are the indicator functions. In the
third period, an individual’s wealth is what he has saved in the previous period, as
well as what he has received in bequests from his parents. Note that the distribution
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of the wealth holdings is identical to the distribution of the next generation’s parental
wealth holdings (i.e., x = xp
′
).
The rest of the paper focuses on stationary equilibrium analysis. Since analytical results
are not obtainable, numerical methods are used to solve the model.
10. Calibration
I calibrate the model to match the current U.S. economy, and the calibration strategy
I adopt here is the following. The values of some standard parameters are predetermined
based on previous studies, and the values of the rest of the parameters are then simultane-
ously chosen to match some key empirical moments in the U.S. economy.
10.1. Demographics and Preferences
One period in my model is equivalent to 30 years. Individuals enter the economy when
they are 30 years old (Period 2). They retire at 60 years old (Period 3) and die at the end of
the third period at 90 years old.
The subjective discount factor β is calibrated to match an annual interest rate of 0.04,
which gives an annual discount factor of 0.915. I calibrate my bequest parameters to ensure
that the level and distribution of bequests generated from my benchmark model matches
their respective data counterparts. Specifically, φ1 is calibrated to match the aggregate be-
quest to wealth ratio: 0.31 according to the estimation by Gale and Scholz (1994). A positive
value of φ2 implies that bequests are luxury goods, and its value controls the skewness of
the bequests distribution. According to the empirical estimation by Hurd and Smith (2002),
about 90% of the population does not leave a significant amount of bequests (i.e. less than
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Table 13: The Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Source
z 1.0 Normalization
σ 1.5 Macro Literature
θ 0.36 Macro Literature
δ 0.04 Macro Literature
γ 0.2 Haveman and Wolfe (1995)
ρ 0.4 Solon (1992)
χ 5.5 million IRS 2017
τ 0.4 IRS 2017
Parameter Value Moment to match
β 0.915 annual interest rate: 0.04
φ1 -0.33 bequest/wealth ratio: 0.31
φ2 0.086 pop. share with bequests (< third of avg. income)
σ2ψ 1.15 Income Gini: 0.63
a third of average lifetime income)12. Gale and Scholz (1994) report that 96% do not receive
inheritances above 3,000 dollars. In the benchmark calibration, I calibrate the value of φ2
so that 90% of agents in the benchmark model receive bequests that are less than a third of
median lifetime income.
I use the 1990 U.S. census data to calibrate the fertility choices for each group in my
benchmark model13. I follow the approach in Jones and Tertilt (2007) and use ”children
ever born” as the fertility measure. Specifically, I use the sample of currently married women
ages 40-50 (birth cohort 1940-50), and then organize the respondents into 11 ability groups
12In nominal terms, that value equals $187,600 in 1993 dollars or $324,700 in 2017 dollars.
13Courtesy of Steven Ruggles, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. Inte-
grated Public Use Micro data Series: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015.
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0.
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corresponding to my model distribution by occupational income, corrected for a 2% growth
rate.14 The propensity of death on childbirth during this time period is low enough that the
child mortality risk is not a significant issue. I take the mean fertility rate for each group
and assign it to the corresponding group of agents in my benchmark model to generate the
appropriate level of differential fertility by income.15 The resulting fertility-income rela-
tionship from my calibration exercise is reported in Table 15, which is consistent with the
estimation results in Jones and Tertilt (2007). For instance, the income elasticity of fertility
is estimated to be -0.20 to -0.21 for the cohorts of women born between 1940 and 1950 in
Jones and Tertilt (2007), while the implied income elasticity of fertility from my calibrated
fertility distribution is -0.22.
10.2. Technology and Earning Ability
The capital share θ is set to 0.36, and the capital depreciation rate is set to 0.04. Both are
commonly used values in the macro literature. The value of TFP parameter, z, is normal-
ized to one.
I approximate the AR(1) process for earning ability ψ by an 11-state Markov chain using
the method introduced in Tauchen (1986). The coefficient of intergenerational persistence,
ρ, is set to 0.4 according to the estimates in Solon (1992). I calibrate the income variance
σ2ψ so that the income Gini coefficient generated from the model matches the value of 0.63
that Castaneda et al. (2003) estimated using 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances data. I
report the resulting ability levels in Table 15 and the corresponding transition matrix can
14Here I follow Jones and Tertilt (2007) closely and use the husband’s occupational income to avoid the se-
lection bias in the mother’s employment status.
15Note that the fertility choice in my model is the per parent fertility so I follow the tradition in the fertility
literature and halve these fertility rates calculated from the data when using them in the model.
46
be seen in Section ?? of the Appendix. In addition, I set the time cost of children γ to be 0.2
of parental time per child based on the empirical estimates of Haveman and Wolfe (1995).
The key parameter values and their sources are summarized in Table 13.
10.3. Taxation
The two taxation coefficients, τ and χ, are taken from the 2017 CFR 601.602: Tax forms
and instructions. The section titled ”Unified Credit Against Estate Tax” states ”for an estate
of any decedent dying in calendar year 2017, the basic exclusion amount is $5,490,000 for
determining the amount of the unified credit against estate tax under S2010.” I combine
this with table 5 - section 1(e) ”Estates and Trusts” which states that the rate of taxation for
estates greater than $12,500 is ”$3,232.50 plus 39.6% of the excess over $12,500.”
This gives us an estimated value of τ of 0.4 and a value of χ of 5.5 million in my bench-
mark. Since my model is normalized, I setχ to match a multiple of median lifetime income,
which I estimate as $1,180,000 which is $59,039 per household in 2017 (U.S. Census Bureau)
times 40 years divided by 2 people. This means the 2017 estate tax exemption is 4.6 times
the median lifetime income.
11. Quantitative Results
I start this section by reviewing the main properties of the benchmark model at the
steady state, with special attention given to its implications for wealth inequality. I then run
counter-factual policy experiments analyzing the abolition of the estate tax, an increase of
the estate tax back to 2001 levels, and changing the structure of the intergenerational tax
from a estate tax to an inheritance tax.
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Table 14: Benchmark Model Statistics
Name Model Data
Annual Interest Rate 0.04 0.04
US Aggregate Bequest/Wealth Ratio 0.31 0.31
Average fertility rate per household 2.3 2.3
Gini Coefficient of the US Income Distribution 0.64 0.63
Income Elasticity of Fertility -0.22 -0.20/-0.21
11.1. Some Key Properties of the Benchmark Economy
A key element of my theory is the negative income-fertility relationship, which is best
measured by the income elasticity of fertility. The income elasticity of fertility implied by
my benchmark model is very close to its empirical counterpart estimated by Jones and
Tertilt (2007). Another important characteristic of my model is the skewed distribution
of bequests with a long right tail. I ensure the model matches the bequest distribution
I observe in the data by modelling bequests as luxury goods in the fashion of De Nardi
(2004) and De Nardi and Yang (2016). In addition, my calibration strategy implies that my
benchmark model matches the bequest-capital ratio and the 90th percentile of bequest
amount.
Table 14 contains some key statistics of the benchmark economy together with their
data counterparts. As can be seen, my calibrated benchmark model matches the key em-
pirical moments from the US economy fairly well. Table 15 summarizes the ability distri-
bution generated by my benchmark model, along with how the average fertility calculated
by ability groups match up against the data. The first row represents the relative value of
the ability ψi for Group i, in which the value for Group 6 is normalized to unity. The second
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Table 15: Fertility-Income Relationship from the Benchmark Model
Ability Group i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ψi 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.46 1.0 2.19 4.81 10.56 23.16 50.80
Cumulative Mass 0.004 0.015 0.064 0.185 0.383 0.617 0.815 0.937 0.985 0.996 1.0
Fertility per Parent 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.24 1.15 1.08 1.07 0.96 0.86 0.89
Data source: 1990 U.S. Census
row is the share of the population whose ability is equal to or less than that group. Hence,
Group 11—the highest ability group in my model—corresponds to the top 0.4% and the top
two groups together correspond to the top 2% of the population. Of special note is Groups
8 through 11, as these are the ones that give almost all bequests in the economy.
12. Counterfactual Models
In order to determine the impact of the taxation regime that I have instated in this
model, I run several counterfactual models. All these models are recalibrated to match the
bequest wealth ratio, the 90th percentile of bequest moment, the average fertility and elas-
ticity of fertility, the interest rate and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. They
institute different exemption levels, rates and structures to the intergenerational transfer
tax. In all cases the tax that is levied continues to be distributed equally to all members of
that generation as a lump sum transfer.
12.1. No Estate Tax
The first counterfactual model attempts to ascertain the quantitative effect of abolish-
ing the estate tax. In this model the tax rate is set to zero, so no estates pay taxes no matter
how large. No government revenue is generated. No transfer payments occur.
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12.2. 2001 Estate Tax
The second counterfactual model changes rates and exemption level to match the es-
tate tax law in 2001. This means a top rate of 55% and an exemption level of $675,000. This
is an exemption level that is 1/8 the exemption level of the benchmark. The higher rate and
lower exemption level will generate larger government revenues and the transfer payment
outlays will be larger as a result.
As with the benchmark model, this is an overstatement of the actual affects of the es-
tate tax, as there are numerous avoidance strategies allowing individuals to not pay their
full tax burden that this model does not take into account. However this alteration to the
intergenerational transfer tax will generate much larger lump sum payments from the gov-
ernment. It will also result in a significantly smaller amount of bequests that are received by
the children of the top few percentiles. This will result in a less extreme wealth distribution.
12.3. Inheritance Tax
The final counterfactual model will replace the estate tax with an inheritance tax. The
rate will remain at 55%, and the exemption level is calibrated to match the total government
revenue from the 2001 case. I chose 2001 as more individuals were affected by the tax and
therefore the comparison will be more clear cut. This means the the transfer payment from
the inheritance tax will be identical to the transfer payment in the 2001 estate tax case. The
only difference is that a larger burden will fall on families with fewer children and a lighter
burden will fall on families will more children relative to the estate tax.
This is because the inheritance tax will calculate the tax payment after the parental be-
quest is divided among their children. If there are more children, the amount received by
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each child is smaller, and they are more likely to be receiving an amount that is below the
exemption level, or, if the amount is still above the exemption level, less of it will be taxable.
As the rate remains the same as in the estate tax case, this will result is a direct increase in
tax burden to families with fewer children and a decrease to families with more children.
13. Distributionary Effects
In this section, I examine the distributions generated by my benchmark model and
compare them to the counterfactuals. I analyze the distribution of wealth, savings and
bequests and mine these results for insights on the impact of fertility and transfer taxation
on distribution of wealth.
The wealth distribution in this model is untargeted, and gives me a method to evaluate
how the model does with replicating the actual distribution of wealth in the United States,
as well as allowing me to evaluate the different counterfactuals against each other with
regards to their impact on the wealth distribution.
13.1. Benchmark Wealth Distribution
I compute the proportion of overall wealth held by each percentile group in my bench-
mark model and compare it against the data. It is important to remember that these statis-
tics of the wealth distribution are not used as my targeted moments in the calibration.
Some key statistics of the wealth distribution are reported in Table 16.
Overall my model does moderately accurate job of matching the actual distribution of
wealth in the U.S., especially among the top 20%. As can be seen in the last column of Table
16, my benchmark model matches the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution closely.
51
Table 16: Wealth Distribution
Percentile < 60% 60−80 % > 80% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Data 0.08 0.13 0.79 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.78
Benchmark Model 0.05 0.15 0.80 0.18 0.29 0.16 0.77
No Estate Tax 0.04 0.13 0.82 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.79
2001 Estate Tax 0.09 0.14 0.77 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.74
Inheritance Tax 0.10 0.15 0.75 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.71
Data source: Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)
The Survey of Consumer Finance data shows the top 20% holding 79% of the data, while
my model predicts they will hold 80%. The data shows the top 10 and 5% holding 67 and
54% of economic wealth respectively. My model predicts these values to be 68 and 45%.
As the distribution moves into the extreme right tail of the distribution, my model has a
harder and harder time matching the high degree of wealth concentration.
The richest 1% from my benchmark model hold significantly less wealth than the data.
My model predicts they will hold 16% of the wealth, while in the data they hold 30%. Clearly
there is additional wealth concentrating mechanisms not present in my model. Potential
explanations not modeled here are preventative savings for income shocks, entrepreneur-
ship, and preference heterogeneity. However, using only intergenerational transfer of wealth
and fertility differentials does do much better at matching the data than traditional macroe-
conomic calibrated simulations that predict the top 1 percent will hold 4 percent of the
wealth (Aiyagari (1994)). This indicates the importance of these two mechanisms, and in-
dicates that fertility, a mechanism typically overlooked by macroeconomic simulations, is
a crucial piece of the puzzle for explaining wealth inequality.
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13.2. Counterfactual Wealth Distribution
13.2.1. No Estate Tax
Comparing my benchmark to the counterfactuals yields some interesting observations.
As expected, abolishing the estate tax increases overall inequality. Specifically it increases
the wealth holding of the top 1% by 12% and the wealth holding of the top 20% by 2.5%.
This is notable because very few individuals are actually paying estate taxes and they are
clustered at the far end of the right side of the wealth distribution. So outside the extremely
rich, few were affected by the estate tax. Abolishing the estate tax therefore has an outsize
impact on the wealth distribution because it is such a targeted tax.
The other major impact of abolishing the estate tax is the removal of the transfer pay-
ment. While the size of the payment was small (roughly $3000 per person in this model’s
benchmark calibration, or less than $100 per year), it was helpful to less wealthy individu-
als. Consequently the wealth holding of the bottom 80% decreases slightly as a result.
13.2.2. 2001 Estate Tax
The 2001 estate tax level has a much lower exemption (about one eighth) than the
benchmark model. In addition it has a higher rate, .55 from .4. This means a larger amount
of individuals will have to pay the tax, as well as the individuals already affected paying a
much larger share. The impact of this is that the impact on the wealth distribution is no
longer felt solely by the super rich. The top 1% drop their share of wealth from the bench-
mark model by 6% and the top 20 drop by 4%.
Comparing the 2001 estate tax counterfactual to the no bequest counterfactual yields
even more extreme results. Abolishing the estate tax from 2001 levels increases the wealth
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holdings of the top 1% by 19% and the top 20% by 6%. While the estate tax affects relatively
few households, the fact that it affects the extremely rich means that its wealth distribu-
tional influence is significant. In addition, the transfer payment increases, and the wealth
holdings of the lower percentiles correspondingly expands. The bottom 60% nearly dou-
ble their wealth holdings as a percentage of the total wealth in the economy, which is a
combination effect of the wealthy’s bequests being taxed more heavily and the less wealthy
benefiting relatively more from the increased transfer payment.
13.2.3. Inheritance Tax
The inheritance tax also leads to a drop in wealth inequality. This is because in the
model, lower ability individuals have more children. So given an equally sized bequest, the
children of lower ability individuals (who are themselves more likely to be lower ability) will
pay relatively lower taxes on their inheritance than the children of higher ability individu-
als. I am looking at this transfer from the perspective of the recipients of the bequests.
However, because lower ability individuals rarely give large bequests in this model the
main influence of the taxation regime switch is the transfer of the tax burden from the 90%
percentile to fall more heavily on the top 1%. While the fertility differences between these
two groups is not large (around .4 childen per household) the aggregate effects are signif-
icant. I see a decrease in the wealth holding of the top 1% by around 6%, and a decrease
in the Gini coefficient of wealth by 4% when compared to the estate tax that generates the
same amount of revenue.
This leads to a crucial conclusion of this model. The structure of the intergenerational
transfer tax has a major impact on where the tax burden lies and the corresponding impact
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of the tax on wealth distribution. Models that do not acknowledge the fertility differential
between different earning levels will miss this insight.
13.3. Bequests
I compute the proportion of overall bequests made by each percentile group in my
benchmark model and compare it against the data. Some key statistics of the bequest dis-
tribution are reported in Table 17.
The bequest distribution comparison between the benchmark and the counterfactual
models is largely what would be expected. Abolishing taxes increases the bequest share of
the top 1% by nearly 30% compared to the benchmark model. As the tax rate is increased
and exemption lowered to the 2001 counterfactual model, the share of the top 10% also
drops by 4%, as more and more individuals have to pay the estate tax, and the tax on the
amount in excess of the exemption is increased by 37.5%.
Changing to an inheritance tax does not alter the distribution of bequests very much,
though there is a slight drop in the bequests received by the top 1%. This is intuitive, as
the top 1% have the lowest number of children and would be more relatively effected by an
inheritance tax. It is important to remember that there is high persistence of ability (and
therefore wealth) across generations, so the highest ability individuals tend to have fewer
siblings.
13.4. Savings
I compute the proportion of overall savings chosen by each percentile group in my
benchmark model and compare it against the data. The savings distribution for my bench-
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Table 17: Bequest Distribution
Percentile < 90% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark 0.01 0.29 0.40 0.30 0.93
No Estate Tax <0.01 0.13 0.47 0.40 0.96
2001 Estate Tax 0.05 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.93
Inheritance Tax 0.05 0.23 0.42 0.31 0.93
Table 18: Savings Distribution
Percentile < 90% 90−95 % 95−99 % >99% Gini Coef.
Benchmark 0.41 0.13 0.27 0.19 0.75
No Estate Tax 0.42 0.14 0.26 0.18 0.72
2001 Estate Tax 0.37 0.17 0.28 0.19 0.75
Inheritance Tax 0.33 0.15 0.31 0.23 0.81
mark is reported in Table 18, as well as the savings distributions for each of my counterfac-
tual extensions.
The savings distribution reveals the impact of transfer payments and bequests. Because
these both increase an individuals wealth as they enter retirement, an individual saves less
as a result, and increases consumption in the first period. This means that raising the es-
tate tax actually increases the savings share of the top 1%. Of special note is the inheritance
tax, which increases savings among the top of the distribution. This is because these indi-
viduals are receiving a lower amount of bequests after taxes and therefore save more as a
result.
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14. Conclusion
This paper pursued three goals. First, to build and run a simple overlapping generations
model including intergenerational transfers and a simple representation of the estate tax. I
achieved this using a three period model with childhood, adulthood and retirement, where
individuals chose differential fertility and gave bequests to their children. Second, to match
the wealth-income inequality disparity seen in the data, where wealth inequality is higher
than income inequality. My result match this dispairity, though it must be noted that I am
unable to match the wealth level held by the top 1%. Finally, to quantitatively analyze the
policy experiment of switching from an estate tax regime to an inheritance tax regime. I did
this, and showed a switch would generate a more equitable distribution of wealth. Overall,
my results show that the estate tax exemption levels and rates have an outsized affect on
inequality for how few household are affected.
I conclude the paper by drawing attention to a few potentially important issues from
which this paper has abstracted. This paper simplifies the life-cycle savings process. A
model with a larger number of time periods and income shocks would generate greater
variance in life-cycle savings and thus more wealth inequality. This model also simplifies
the bequest motive and how it interacts with taxes. I intend to pursue a more nuanced
model in future research.
15. Essay 3
Do private labor market conditions have an effect on the observable quality of teachers
hired, and subsequent student outcomes? Economic theory suggests the answer is yes. If
57
lower variation in salary and therefore less reward for quality work are attributes of public
sector jobs, then public sector workers are negatively selected. Bonin, et al. (2007) show oc-
cupational sorting matching low-aptitude applicants with low-earnings-risk professions.
During a recession, the reduction in private sector salaries erodes this negative selection,
causing an inflow of higher quality individuals from the private to the public sector.
The two research questions this study proposes to answer are:
• Do recessions cause worker migration from the riskier private sector into the rela-
tively acyclic public sector?
• Are individuals hired during slack labor markets fundamentally different from those
hired during robust labor markets, as measured by observable results and ability
scores?
In this paper I show that individuals are responsive to recessions. Research has shown
recessions have major long term effects on individuals entering the labor force (Oreopou-
los, Wachter, Heisz, 2006). While past research has explored individuals upgrading their
skills during recession, this paper instead focuses on occupational migration. During an
economic downturn the probability density function of private sector wages faced by job-
seeking individuals will shift, while education hiring will remain relatively stable, as de-
mand for public sector workers is more acyclic than private sector workers (Berman and
Pfleeger, 1997). This shift will change the expected wages offered relative to other profes-
sions, without changing the local underlying political and cultural characteristics deter-
mining wage level. Recessions effectively raise the relative expected wage exogenously.
The major contribution of this paper is to analyze the effect of labor market conditions
on the quality of new hires. In this paper I use primary and secondary level teachers as
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the quintessential example of public sector workers to test the hypothesis that quality of
hires increases during times of slackness. Using American Community Survey data, this
paper shows a novel result: there are differing effects of recession on job market sorting
for college graduates with education and non-education undergraduate degrees. I show
evidence that non-education majors increase entry into the teaching profession when a
recession occurs as they are entering the labor market for the first time. This is an impor-
tant result, as teacher quality has been shown to be a key input in student achievement and
economic outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, Rockoff 2015), and a policy with higher levels and
variation in teacher salary could duplicate this recession effect.
Additionally, this paper matches two data sources, the NBER US Business Cycle Expan-
sions and Contractions, and administrative data from North Carolina, to uniquely analyze
the direct effect of labor market conditions on the quality of teachers as measured by their
certification test score. This paper finds that 5th grade and Algebra II teachers hired dur-
ing a recession score better on the math section of the certification exams by about 0.1
standard deviation.
Finally, I follow a working paper by Nagler, Piopiunik and West (NBER Working Paper
No. 21393) and examine the effect of recession on standardized test scores. I use value
added testing as a metric for student outcomes.16 I draw on data of both elementary and
high school teachers. Nagler, et al. find that 5th grade teachers who are hired during a
recession have on average 0.08 of a standard deviation higher math value added than non-
recession teachers. My result is smaller, 0.04, but still significant. I also find that Algebra
II teachers hired during a recession have improved value-added scores of 0.07 standard
16Chetty, et al. (2015) offer substantial justification for using value added metrics as a measure of student
outcomes
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deviations.
This rest of this paper is organized into five sections. In the first I look at recession
as a motivator of labor market decision making. Specifically, I scrutinize whether reces-
sion impacts the decision to become a teacher, and if so, whether this affect is different
for individuals who received a bachelor’s in an education-related field compared to those
who received a bachelor’s in a non-education related field. In the second and third sec-
tions, I look at the effect of recession on observable measures of teacher quality. First, I
use the teacher’s own test scores on a certification test. Second, I use students’ test scores
on a state-mandated standardized test to generate a calculated measure of value added for
each teacher. The fourth section contains falsification tests, balancing tests, and tests of
differential attrition. The fifth section concludes.
15.1. Literature Review
Heterogeneous occupational earnings and separation risk have a major impact on worker
characteristics. Murphy and Topel (1987) and Moore (1995) find professions with higher
unemployment and earnings risk are compensated with higher wages. Hartog, et al. (2003)
extends this to find higher wages are also linked to higher earnings variability. Individuals
who accept riskier, more variable jobs are compensated for their uncertainty. Conversely,
individuals who work safer jobs, such as those in the public sector, are paid relatively less.
Bonin, et al. (2007) and Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen (2014), identify risk-inclined in-
dividuals and find they sort into riskier professions. Risk-adverse individuals will instead
choose lower-risk jobs that tend to be lower paid.
During recession this orderly sorting is disrupted. Not only will many occupations (par-
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ticularly in the private sector) see large spikes in risk, but Moscarini and Vella (2008) find
a large increase in noise as workers enter jobs less suited for their level of risk desire. They
also find that occupational mobility declines with age, family commitments, and educa-
tion. However, during recession this decline is weakened, and is reversed for college grad-
uates. I find part of this occupational mobility is high quality individuals moving from the
private to the public sector.
The relationship between government employees and the private labor markets grew in
prominence during the years following the Great Recession. Relatively stable public sector
pay in the face of a weak job market has become a subject of considerable contention, and
the interconnected role of unions, especially teacher’s unions, has been pivotal in political
battles at the national, state, and local level.
At the core of this debate is whether public sector employees are fundamentally differ-
ent from private sector employees. The literature has shown public sector workers, includ-
ing teachers, face different incentive structures from the private sector and are influenced
by a variety of factors not seen in private labor markets. Brueckner and Neumark (2014)
find a relationship between public sector wage differentials and local amenities. They find
public sector workers are relatively better paid in areas with amenities difficult to dupli-
cate elsewhere, such as climate or skill density. They also find that the strength of public
sector unions exacerbate this effect. As teachers are one of the largest groups of public
sector workers, this finding is indicative of a close link between non-performance-related
attributes and salary. Diamond (2015) also finds a great deal of responsiveness of public
sector workers to their economic climate. Inelastic housing supply raises local govern-
ments’ tax revenue and public sector workers capture a share of these rents either through
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increased compensation when formal collective bargaining is legal or by increased corrup-
tion when collective bargaining is outlawed. Boiled down, when the disciplining effects
of taxpayers’ voting with their feet through migration are mitigated, government workers
benefit (Freeman 1986).
Teacher unions have been found to have substantial effects on teacher salary. Barrow
and Rouse (2004) find large school districts tend to overspend more than small ones. Rose
and Sonstelie (2010) find the power of teacher’s unions rises with the number of eligible
voters in a district, with power measured by the pay premium given to experienced teach-
ers. Brunner and Squires (2013) show leaders of more powerful teacher unions are able
to bargain for more generous returns to teacher seniority, to the detriment of staffing ra-
tios and base salaries. These papers indicate that teacher salary is determined by a variety
of factors not related to teacher quality, but rather a variety of political and environmen-
tal causes. This casts doubt on whether public sector workers are responsive to the same
incentives vis-a-vis salary as private sector workers.
Teaching is a more stable profession than many private sector jobs, but offers less op-
portunity for wage growth. Wage dispersion has been rising at a faster rate in private sector
jobs than in public sector jobs since the 1970s (Borjas 2002). This relative change in the
wage structure influences labor supply decisions, and alters worker sorting between the
two sectors. This alteration has led to high-skilled workers such as college graduates avoid-
ing the public sector, while high-skilled public sector workers have increased incentives to
leave for a private sector job. This paper does not attempt to answer what the determi-
nants of public sector pay are, but rather argues that national recessions can be taken as
exogenous shocks to wage structure, thus attempting to sidestep the endogeneity of salary
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determination. Demand for teachers is more acyclic than the private sector (Berman and
Pfleeger, 1997). Several types of analyses show that teachers earn significantly less than
comparable workers in the United States (Allegretto, Corcoran and Mishel 2004). Rick-
man, Wang and Winters (2015) find relative wages significantly impact the choice to enter
the education field. They compute public school teacher salaries for comparison across
U.S. states and find that state differences in federal tax-adjusted teacher salaries relative
to those of other college graduates significantly affects the share of education majors em-
ployed as teachers. If there is an increase in individuals seeking teaching jobs when rela-
tive salary increases, recessions should increase numbers of applicants for teaching jobs.
However, no paper has directly documented individuals sorting into teaching during re-
cessions.
Job seekers respond to incentives, and recession serves to lower their reservation wage
by increasing the amount of effort it takes to search for a job. This increases the likelihood
that job-seekers will accept a job with a relatively lower wage, like an American teacher
(Borjas 2002). Recessions have negative long term effects on individuals entering the labor
force, impacting salaries and opportunities long after the recession has passed (Oreopou-
los, Wachter and Heisz, 2006) as well as future job mobility (Neal 1999). Personal attributes
have been found to drive occupational sorting; as Fouarge, Kriechel and Dohmen (2014)
show, individual risk appetite and patience has a large impact on career choice, and a mis-
match between personal predilections and career choice increases probability of career
migration.
My paper is the first to directly document a link between recessions and teacher test
scores. 17 Salary differentials can be a result of an endogenous political or cultural pro-
17Figlio (1997), Dolton and Holloway, (2011) or Hanushek, Piopiunik, and Wiederhold (2015) show the rela-
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cess. Researchers need to find an alternate exogenous cause of teacher salary change. This
paper’s identification strategy uses national recessions to fulfill this purpose, as a national
recession is unrelated to local political machinations. If the prevailing economic climate
is poor, individuals entering public service may experience unwelcome competition from
unemployed private sector workers, boosting the quality of the individual hired on aver-
age. This paper uniquely contributes to the literature by showing that teacher quality is
impacted by economic recession.
16. Labor Market Inquiry
16.1. Data
I estimate a model using data from the National Bureau of Economic Research and the
American Community Survey, courtesy of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. This
regression looks at the effect of market conditions on the industry in which a student finds
employment.
In this regression, I wanted to explore the question of what happens to graduates when
recession occurs after they graduate with a bachelor’s degree. Since the late 1990s, states
have relaxed certification processes to allow individuals with bachelor’s degrees not in the
field of education to become teachers. This regression attempts to see if more of them enter
the teaching profession during recessions.
I obtained American Community Survey data on 365,520 college graduates over age 18
and under the age of 28 at the time of census (to reduce occupation and location migra-
tionship between nationwide cognitive skill tests or relative teacher salaries and student outcomes.
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tion, as well as to avoid respondents who had experienced multiple recession periods18)
gathered between the years 2009 and 2014 using IPUMS. Using data from the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, I matched them to a recession dummy. The recession dummy
is taken from the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee. It is coded as 1 if a national
recession begins or is ongoing in that year. I did not use local recession or employment
data as that would introduce the confounding possibility of labor mobility, which my data
set is not equipped to handle.
Table 1 contains summary statistics on a selection of races, gender, age, and undergrad-
uate field of study. Education degree holders are disproportionately female, and are more
likely to currently hold a job than individuals with a degree from a different field.
16.2. Empirical Methods
I then estimated the following fixed effect linear probability regression with clustered
errors by state.
FieldofOccupationist = αs + LaborDummyti + β1RecessionDummyti + β2χi + i
where Field of Occupation for person i, in state s and at time t is the field the person
declared as their occupation in the ACS. It is an indicator variable that is one when the
field is education related, and zero when it is not. This includes postsecondary teachers,
preschool and kindergarten teachers, elementary and middle school teachers, secondary
school teachers, special education teachers, and other education, training, and library
workers. The labor dummy is a control variable that takes a value of 1 when the individual
18For instance, an individual who is 28 during 2008, a recession, was 21 during 2001, a recession, and that
recession may make them more likely to seek a teaching degree, and give a false signal about recessions at age
28.
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is currently in the labor force at the time of the survey. αs is the state fixed effect. χi is
education degree, census year, gender and ethnic controls. The ethnic dummies include
White, Black/Negro, American Indian or Alaska Native, Chinese, Japanese, other Asian or
Pacific Islander, other race, two major races and three or more major races.  is an error
term.
16.3. Results
I ran the regression with a recession dummy for ages 22-24. I also ran a separate regres-
sion for ages 19-21 to act as a falsification test. Standard error is adjusted for 51 clusters by
state and D.C.
Results are reported in table 2. Each cell is a separate regression. The dependent vari-
able is a dummy that takes the value of unity when the individual works in an educational
occupation. The rows are different age during recession dummies, and the columns are dif-
ferent subsamples depending on the type of degree the individual graduated with. I include
the same ethnic, labor force and gender controls for every regression. For example, the
coefficient reported for the first regression is an independent dummy variable with value
unity for the people who turned 19-21 during a recession (so birth cohorts 1987-1989).
The effect of recession after graduation was significantly positive only for individuals
who do not hold an education degree, and has an effect of 0.09 percent. It is insignifi-
cant for education degree holders. This would indicate that recession is a motivator for
non-education degree holders to enter the teaching profession. I include recession before
graduation to act as a falsification test and find no significant results.
Something to note is that this dataset does not pass balancing tests, as the observables
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of college graduates change depending on the cohort. To this end I also ran a regression
looking only at individuals graduating college before and during the Great Recession, and
excluding those who graduated after 2009. My result is till significant, though the coeffi-
cient is lower at 0.06 percent. In this subsample the observable characteristics of college
graduates do not change as a result of the recession, and I pass balancing tests on those
observables. I follow this practice of comparing recession affected individuals only to pre-
recession individuals (and not post) in the later two sections.
17. Teacher Test Scores Inquiry
In this section I run two regressions. The first looks at the effect of labor market condi-
tions on observable teacher ability, measured by teacher qualification exams. The second
replicates Nagler, et al. using data from a different state and extends their work to high
school students.
17.1. Data
All student and teacher data was provided by the North Carolina Education Research
Data Center (NCERDC). The North Carolina Education Research Data Center is a unique
portal to a store of data from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (DPI)
and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
Using data on years of teacher experience, I match teachers to the year in which they
were hired, then matched their year of hire to whether there was a recession in that year.
The recession dummy is taken from the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee. It is
coded as 1 if a national recession begins or is ongoing in the year in which the teacher
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entered their profession. Local recession or employment data was not used as that would
introduce the confounding of labor mobility, which my data set is not equipped to handle.
I was also able to obtain whether a teacher had earned a master’s degree and included this
as a control variable.
My data set included the Praxis teacher examination scores for a subset of the teachers
being considered. To my knowledge the effect of the labor market conditions on teacher
test scores has not been estimated.
I ran a regression to estimate this effect:
TeacherTestScorej = β0+β1RecessionDummyjt+β2TeacherControlsj+β3Y earF ixedEffectt+µ
The variable of interest is a dummy variable that is 1 when a teacher is hired during a
recession and 0 otherwise.
I was able to match 441 Algebra II teachers and 3700 5th grade teachers to the Praxis
math test. This is fewer than the subsequent Value Added analysis due to the test not be-
ing recorded prior to the early 90s and the fact that teachers may have taken an alternative
certification test. The Praxis test included is the Pre-Professional Skills Test (Math score).
When teachers had taken multiple tests I kept only the score from the first test taken. There
is no reason to think that the teachers matched are more or less susceptible to labor market
conditions at time of hire, so the estimate will remain unbiased. I normalized teacher test
score to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Teacher controls include gen-
der and ethnicity. Summary statistics are detailed in Table 3. Teachers are predominately
68
female. Standard errors are clustered by hire year. Results are reported in Table 4. The
two columns are for 5th grade teachers and Algebra II teachers respectively. I also run this
regression only on teachers hired during a recession or 5 years previous to a recession, to
match my labor sorting regressions and to ensure I am getting a clean comparison between
individuals hired in the zenith and nadir of the business cycle.
17.2. Results
I find that 5th grade teachers hired during a recession scored significantly better than
teachers not hired during a recession. 5th Grade recession hires scored 0.107 standard de-
viations higher and Algebra II teachers scored 0.114 standard deviations higher. This lends
credence to my theory that these are individuals of higher academic ability driven into the
teacher profession by a slack job market. The recession plus 5 years previous subsample
shows similar results, though my 5th grade coefficient becomes weaker.
18. Teacher Value Added Inquiry
I follow Nagler, Piopiunik and West as closely as possible. First I construct a measure
of teacher value added using 3rd, 4th and 5th grade test scores from over 2 million North
Carolina students between 1995-2011. I then use the same techniques on a group not con-
sidered by Nagler, et al: High School Algebra students. Using math scores from 8th grade as
well as Algebra I and II standardized scores, I use the same model to evaluate labor market
conditions on student outcomes.19
19Historically the measurement of student outcomes has been contentious. While a good teacher can have
a profound impact on learning outcomes, evaluating teachers has lead to a great deal of controversy, as the va-
lidity of commonly used value added metrics has been called into question. ”High stakes tests” adds to stress
faced by students and teacher retention and pay resulting from their value added metric has added additional
pressure to these examinations. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) offer support for the effectiveness of
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18.1. State Comparison
While Nagler, et al. use administrative data from Florida, the data in this paper comes
from North Carolina. Using information obtained from USC Rossier, Table 6 compares and
contrasts key statistics in each state. The two states are largely similar, though Florida pays
its teachers more, North Carolina has a slightly higher wage relative to the average wage
in the state. Both states allow lateral entry.20 To become certified as a teacher in Florida,
an individual needs to complete a number of college credit hours, a teacher preparation
course, and Florida General Knowledge Test and the Florida Subject Area Examinations.
Certification testing in Florida is run by FTCE (Florida Teacher Certification Examinations),
and is specific to Florida. North Carolina uses the standard Praxis Pre-professional Skills
Test (PPST), along with subject specific tests (Praxis II). States offer alternative licensure
programs for teachers who do not have the experience required for a traditional license.
This is an alternate route to teaching for individuals outside of the public education system.
a using value added evaluation to estimate student outcomes. Their paper looks at elementary and middle
school teachers who have substantially improved the standardized test scores of their students. They found
that students assigned to high value added teachers are more likely to attend college, less likely to experi-
ence teen pregnancy, and earn higher salaries. These high value added teachers are correlated with a lasting
positive effect on those students’ lives beyond academics. Chetty, et al. tracked 2.5 million students over 20
years. Replacing a teacher whose value added measurement is in the bottom 5 percent with a teacher from the
center of the value added distribution would increase the present value of students’ lifetime income by approx-
imately 250,000 dollars per classroom. Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) find that improving teacher quality,
as measured by student test scores, one standard deviation has the same effect as reducing classroom size by
ten students. Hanushek (1992) shows that high quality teachers can obtain a gain of 1.5 grade level equiva-
lents while a poor teacher will only accomplish 0.5 grade level equivalents during an entire academic year of
teaching. The evidence suggests that there is teacher level heterogeneity that leads to dramatic differences in
student outcomes. If the teacher is important, then improving the teacher is a surefire way to improve stu-
dent outcomes. A working paper by Hanushek, Piopiunik, and Wiederhold (NBER Working Paper No. 20727)
uses a test of teacher cognitive skills as a variable for teacher quality, and then instrument it with the level of
non-education public sector wages. While Hanushek, et al. were forced to estimate student-teacher relations
due to not having direct student-teacher relationship data, their result shows a very important reevaluation of
how responsive teacher quality is to labor market conditions. They noted that the countries with the highest
level of teacher ability and student results were those who raised relative teacher salaries to a point where they
were recruiting from the top echelon of graduating college classes. This is a result that reinforces my narrative:
higher paid teachers lead to higher quality teachers, lead to better student outcomes.
20Lateral entry allows individuals to obtain a teaching position and begin teaching right away, while obtain-
ing a professional educator’s license as they teach as long as they have a bachelor’s degree.
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Floridans can qualify for a temporary certificate with a Bachelor’s Degree and a passing
score on the Florida Subject Area Examination, and North Carolinians can do the same if
they pass the Praxis exam or equivalent certification exam.
As shown by Lott, and Kenny (2013), the strength of teacher’s unions can have signif-
icant effects on test scores. They can also affect teacher retention and ease of new hires.
North Carolina and Florida systemically differ in their treatment of teacher’s unions, with
North Carolina having stronger union rights. According to Winkler, Scull and Zeehande-
laar’s (2012) ranking of overall teacher union strength, Florida is ranked 50th of the U.S.
States and D.C, and North Carolina is ranked 40th. In terms of membership and resources
they are tied at 47th. For bargaining status (mandatory, permitted, or prohibited), scope of
bargaining, right of unions to deduct agency fees from nonmembers, and legality of teacher
strikes, Florida is ranked 35th and North Carolina is ranked 48th. Regarding the union’s in-
volvement in politics (Teacher unions’ share of financial contributions to state candidates
and political parties, and their representation at the Republican and Democratic national
conventions), Florida is ranked 36th and North Carolina is ranked 29th. As North Carolina’s
union is stronger than Florida’s, I would expect the impact of labor market conditions on
teacher displacement to be less.
18.2. Data
I was able to obtain standardized end of grade test scores from 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th
graders from 1995 to 2011. End of course standardized Algebra I and Algebra II test scores
were included from 1999-2011. I was then able to match these scores to a variety of stu-
dent characteristics using unique student identifier codes, as well as to their 5th grade and
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Algebra II teachers.
For each year and grade I normalized the test scores. I coded a variety of dummy con-
trol variables. Ethnicity includes White, East Asian, Black, non white Hispanic, Indian and
Mixed. Leaning disabled took a value of 1 if the student was flagged as learning disabled
in one or more of reading, math, writing, other, oral, fluency, computational skills, calcu-
lation skills or listening. Limited English took a value of one if the student had a positive
L.E.P. status. A lunch assistance dummy had a value of one of the student was on free or
reduced lunch.
Student test scores are the state end of grade standardized math tests in grades 3, 4,
5 and 8 as well as end of course standardized test scores for Algebra I and II, normalized
by grade and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The dependent
variables are the grade 5 and Algebra II scores. My student characteristic controls are dum-
mies for gender, ethnicity, free/reduced lunch, learning disability and limited English pro-
ficiency. The school control variables were the proportion in each school of different eth-
nicities and free/reduced lunch students. Grade by year fixed effects are also included.
Nagler, et al. also include classroom level controls, which my data does not include.
Table 5 contains summary statistics on the races, genders, disabilities, limited english
and free lunch for the 5th graders and Algebra II students that I have data on. Algebra stu-
dents are relatively white with fewer learning disability students than the 5th grade stan-
dardized test takers.
The test lag coefficient is constrained using the technique of Jackson and Bruegmann
(2009). Quoting them, ”there is attenuation bias on the coefficient of lagged test scores,
due to measurement error in test scores. If lagged test scores are correlated with other
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covariates (very likely), this will bias the coefficients for all covariates.” I ran a 2sls IV re-
gression, using 3rd grade math scores as an instrument for 4th grade math scores and 8th
grade math scores as an instrument for Algebra I scores. The coefficient this generated was
then used as the lag variable coefficient in my value added generating regression. The 4th
grade coefficient (β1 = .971545) is almost identical to Jackson and Bruegmann (0.97), which
is as expected, as they used the exact same data set in their paper, albeit for an shorter
span of years. The coefficient estimated using this IV regression is higher than it otherwise
would have been (0.971545 versus 0.8027556 for 4th grade and 1.060309 versus 0.7997208
for Algebra I)
18.3. Empirical Methods
I run the following regression:
MathScoreigst = β0+θj+β1MathScoreigs(t−1)+β2StudentConi+β3SchoolConst+β4GradebyY earFEtg+µitgs
for student i, teacher j, school s, year t and grade g.
θ is a teacher fixed effect and will generate the value added for the teacher used in the
next section. This regression includes a set of demographic controls for the students and
schools. Due to the fact that this inquiry requires its estimates of teacher value-added to be
comparable across schools, I do not include school fixed effects. Something worth noting
is that the teacher code attached to the student test score in this data is not always the
teacher that taught the class, it is the teacher that administered the test. So if the original
teacher was sick, or busy, or any other reason for being absent on the day of the exam,
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a different teacher will get the credit (or the blame) for the students test scores. If either
good or poor teachers consistently missed their test day (perhaps poor teachers are lazier,
or good teachers have more important things to do) this could cause bias in the results.
However, the NCEDRC estimates that the correct teacher is recorded over 95 percent of the
time, and barring any convincing arguments for bias, it is safe to assume that this small
flaw in the linkage will only result in additional noise in the data, rather than a false signal.
To look at the effect of the job market on the quality of teachers, I used a fixed effects
regression.
TeacherV alueAddedj = β0 + β1RecessionDummyjt + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
The variable of interest is a dummy variable that is 1 when a teacher is hired during a
recession and 0 otherwise.
Teacher controls include gender, ethnicity, masters degree, and 30 years of experience
dummies (Papay and Kraft, forthcoming). This again matches West, et al. Hire year was
established by using the most recent record of the teachers level of experience and match-
ing it to their most recent test, then taking the previous year to the first test date which is
when the profession switch would be made, or two years previous to the test date in the
case of Algebra II, to account for the greater difficulty in switching professions into high
school relative to elementary school. Standard errors are then clustered by hire year. The
data I use has 22,693 5th grade teachers, and 2924 Algebra II teachers. Summary statistics
are reported in Table 7. Results are reported in Table 8. The two columns in the table are the
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two regressions I ran for each group of teachers. I also run this regression only on teach-
ers hired during a recession or 5 years previous to a recession, to match my labor sorting
regressions and to ensure I am getting a clean comparison.
18.4. Results
I find that a recession in year of hire improves 5th grade test scores by 0.037 standard
deviations and Algebra 2 scores by 0.07 standard deviations. The 5th grade coefficient is
about half that estimated by West, et al. This may be a result of unseen attenuation bias
from my imperfect teacher student matching, missing classroom level controls, or simply
be a lower estimate in a range around the true parameter. The Algebra II coefficient is
higher, but less significant, likely due to a smaller sample size. When I run the regression
on the subsample of recessions plus 5 years previous, my coefficients strengthen slightly.
19. Falsification and Attrition
19.1. Falsification Tests
The main hypothesis advanced by this paper is that the teachers hired during recessions
have a higher ability. In order to check whether this is a spurious result, I ran four regres-
sions where the dummy variable indicated if the teacher had been hired up to four years
before the recession. So the first regression has a dummy that is 1 when the teacher was
hired one year after the recession. I ran regressions twice for each year, once for teacher’s
value added, and once for their certification test score.
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TeacherV alueAddedj = β0 + β1RecessionDummyj(t−n) + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
TeacherTestScorej = β0 + β1RecessionDummyj(t−n) + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
The variable of interest is a dummy variable that is 1 when a teacher is hired n years
before a recession and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 9. There was a total of 16
regressions ran, one for each combination of recession year - n dummy, grade and whether
I was looking at the value added or certification scores for each teacher.
The lack of any significant trend in these results support that the effect generated by the
recession year dummy did not happen by chance. There is a weak indication that teachers
hired in the two years preceding a recession (when the economy is moving through the
peak of the business cycle) are lower quality, which is consistent with the hypothesis of
this paper, specifically a strong job market diverts good teachers away from the education
occupation.
19.2. Differential Attrition
In this section I run two regressions that attempt to reveal any teacher attrition, that is,
teacher’s leaving the profession. This could be concerning if low skill teachers hired during
a recession are more likely to leave the teaching profession that high skill teachers. If that
is the case, my results could be driven by differential attrition rather than the recession
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teachers having higher skills at time of hire.
The first regression reprises my earlier regressions, but instead of a dummy variable
that is coded as 1 if the teacher was hired during a recession, it is coded as 1 if the teacher is
hired during a specific year. If there is a clear trend that shows teachers hired during earlier
recessions scoring significantly higher than teachers hired during more recent recessions,
then there is cause for concern that the earlier recession also contained lower skill teachers
that left the profession before they could be recorded. 1980-81 was combined due to lack
of observations. A test year fixed effect was added to ensure I am comparing teachers who
taught at the same time. Algebra II certification is omitted due to lack of observations on a
year by year basis.
TeacherV alueAddedj = β0+β1SpecificRecessionDummyjt+β2TeacherControlsj+TestY earF ixedEffectt+µj
TeacherTestScorej = β0 + β1SpecificRecessionDummyjt + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
Results are shown in Table 10.
I find no clear downward trend in teacher value added (columns 1 and 2). In fact, I find
some evidence of an upward trend in value added, indicating that high skill teachers leave
the teaching profession at a higher rate than lower skill teachers. Again, this is consistent
with the model of job market pressures. It seems that more severe recessions such as 1980-
81 and 2007-08 have a much more severe impact on both value added and certification
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than shorter duration recessions such as 1990 or 2001.
The second attrition test codes a dummy variable that attempts to capture teacher at-
trition directly. Specifically it is coded as 1 when there are no records for that teacher after
2009. I regress this on the value added, certification test scores and recession dummy as
dependent variables, keeping the same teacher controls.
TeacherV alueAddedj = β0 + β1AttritionDummyjt + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
TeacherTestScorej = β0 + β1AttritionDummyjt + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
RecessionDummyj = β0 + β1AttritionDummyjt + β2TeacherControlsj + µj
Results are in Table 11. There are a total of 8 regressions, 4 in the first row that regress
the recession dummy on the attrition dummy for the two groups of teachers in each grade
and 2 more for each grade, one for value added and one for the certification test.
Attrition does not have a significant effect on whether a teacher was hired during a re-
cession, nor does it significantly impact value added or certification scores. I do not find
attrition to be a significant factor in my findings.
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19.3. Balancing Tests
Table 12 and 13 shows a regression of Individual, Student and School level observables
on the treatment variable, which is recession after graduation or at time of hire. School
controls are the proportion of that type of student in that school, which is only available
for certain variables. For my ACS data I need to limit my sample to pass balancing tests,
as the recession changed the observables of college graduates. Post recession college grad-
uates had a higher proportion of females and non-whites. For the North Carolina data,
I find no significant result of observables on my treatment variable, and my F scores are
insignificant, ranging in probability from 0.44 to 0.58.
20. Conclusion
These results have important ramifications for policy makers. If the average quality of
applicants increases during times of high unemployment, the hiring process would benefit
from becoming counter-cyclical, hiring relatively more during times of economic distress.
This would allow the education system to gain higher quality teachers, likely at lower cost,
as well as functioning as a counter recessionary measure. Indeed, as the public education
system is a non-trivial percentage of the GDP of the United States, a policy change that en-
couraged recessionary hiring could have a significant impact on alleviating and shortening
recessionary periods.
This paper also shows the response of college students and graduates to labor mar-
ket conditions. When teaching is seen as relatively more favorable, there is an increase in
teacher quality. Increasing beginning teacher salaries to a point where the teaching pro-
fession attracts the top graduates will make it a more prestigious career choice and create
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a virtuous cycle.
The success of Japanese and Nordic education models cannot be solely attributable to
cultural differences, but also to the fact that the relative pay of teachers is so much higher.
Emulating the countries emphasized by Hanushek, Piopiunik, and Wiederhold, and re-
cruiting from the top echelons of college graduates, as well as paying a salary compatible
with attracting such a elite group, will have a large effect on the outcomes for American
students. Higher quality teachers have a large effect on their student outcomes, and poli-
cymakers should prioritize additional funding to raise teacher salaries.
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Table 19: ACS Summary Statistics
Non-Edu Degree Edu Degree All
Number of Individuals 334,691 30,829 2,019,486
Percentages
Male 43.84 18.73 51.18
White 76.70 89.31 71.57
Black 6.51 4.45 12.15
Asian 11.58 2.87 4.8
Labor Force 86.27 90.55 72.71
21. Appendix
Notes: This table is made up of summary statistics for my ACS data, used to run the
regressions contained in tables 2-3. The first panel is the number of individuals in each
group. The second panel is the percentage of control attributes within each group. The
first column is individuals with a bachelor’s degree in an non-education related field, the
second column is individuals with a bachelor’s degree in a education related field. Asian is
defined as individuals who responded Chinese, Japanese or Other Asian.
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Table 20: Education Occupation Regression
Entire Sample
Recession at Age Edudegree NonEdudegree
19-21 .00067835 -.00010451
(.0010924) (.00022899)
22-24 .00133434 .000963***
(.00112629) (.00027786)
Pre Recession Sub-Sample
19-21 -.00072147 -.0003116
(.00138955) (.0002545)
22-24 -.0002311 .00064314**
(.00121275) (.00025069)
Notes: This table is created from regressing a recession dummy that takes a value of 1
when an individual experiences a recession at a certain age on whether they are employed
in the education occupation when asked to respond to the ACS. The columns show differ-
ing effects depending on whether the individual has a education or non-education related
degree, This also functions as a falsification test similar to table 13. The first panel is my
entire sample, which fails balancing tests, and the second is a subsample that excludes
post-recession observations that passes balancing tests.
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Table 21: Teacher Certification Score Summary Statistics
Grade 5 Algebra II
Recession Non-Recession Recession Non-Recession
Number of Teachers 782 2,918 74 367
Percentages
Male 9.72 11.00 36.49 32.15
Asian 0.38 0.38 0 1.63
Black 11.51 13.88 14.83 16.35
Hispanic 0.38 0.31 0 1.09
Indian 0.90 1.17 0 .27
Mixed 0.38 0.31 1.35 0
Notes: The first panel is the number of teachers in each group. The second panel is the
percentages of each control attribute in that group.These are the teachers who I was able
to match to the Praxis PPST. They are all included in the larger group of teachers that are
used for the value added regression, see table 10.
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Table 22: Teacher Math Score regression
5th Grade Algebra II
Hired in recession .10739791* .11468167**
(.05371536) (.05125446)
Ethnic controls YES YES
Gender controls YES YES
Subsample .0531297* .1123249*
(.0297731) (.0647693)
Ethnic controls YES YES
Gender controls YES YES
Notes: The independent variable of interest is the recession dummy, the dependent
variable is the certification score obtained. The first panel is my entire sample and the sec-
ond is a subsample that excludes post-recession observations in order to match my labor
sorting regression. Both samples pass balancing tests.
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Table 23: Student Summary Statistics
Grade 5 Algebra II
Total Number of Students 3,183,773 582,454
Percentages
Male 50.96 45.88
Asian 2.02 2.52
Black 28.5 24.61
Hispanic 7.27 4.24
Indian 1.49 1.07
Mixed 2.47 1.80
Learning Disability 6.63 1.65
Limited English 1.08 1.68
Free/Reduced Lunch 23.3 29.57
Notes: The first panel is the number of students in each group. The second panel is the
percentages of each control attribute in that group.
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Table 24: N.C. and Florida Comparison
North Carolina Florida
Mean Elementary Salary 43,200 49,820
Mean Secondary Salary 44,730 52,640
Teacher Salary vs. State Average 1.28 1.23
Vacation Weeks per Year 15 15
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 14.12 14.33
Expenditure per Pupil 9,088 11,819
Notes; This table compares key statistics between North Carolina, my source of data,
and Florida, where West, et al. sources their data.
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Table 25: Teacher Value Added Summary Statistics
Grade 5 Algebra II
Recession Non-Recession Recession Non-Recession
Number of Teachers 3,942 18,751 575 2,349
Percentages
Male 10.88 10.23 35.48 35.04
Asian .30 .28 .70 1.61
Black 13.62 14.08 10.78 14.18
Hispanic .60 .45 1.04 .72
Indian .68 .89 1.04 .47
Mixed .22 .19 .35 .26
Masters Degree 22.89 23.44 32.65 34.03
Notes: The first panel is the number of teachers in each group. The second panel is the
percentages of each control attribute in that group.
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Table 26: Teacher Value Added regression
5th Grade Algebra II
Hired in recession .0373917*** .0705392*
(.0122074) (.0390345)
Experience Dummy YES YES
Ethnic controls YES YES
Gender controls YES YES
Subsample .0458194*** .1096588**
(.0148793) (.049731)
Experience Dummy YES YES
Ethnic controls YES YES
Gender controls YES YES
Notes: The independent variable of interest is the recession dummy, the dependent
variable is the teacher’s value added. The first panel is my entire sample and the second is
a subsample that excludes post-recession observations in order to match my labor sorting
regression. Both samples pass balancing tests.
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Table 27: Falsification Test
Value Added Certification Score
5th Grade Algebra II 5th Grade Algebra II
Recession-1 -.0476634 -.0630376 -.04573648 -.08558957
(.10972009) (.0693325) (.10877057) (.05109763)
Recession-2 -.04443858 -.0078595 -.07636872 -.03061457
(.04614624) (.084638) (.04671956) (.0447887)
Recession-3 .03918466 .065524 .06768578 -.17954778
(.05717472) (.0586436) (.05798671) (.03036966)
Recession-4 .07512292 -.067671 .0685745 -.02235235
(.06424916) (.0663962) (.06351492) (.0548125)
Notes: The 4 rows are years preceding a recession. The columns are different groups of
teachers and different dependent variables.
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Table 28: Attrition 1
Value Added Certification Score
5th Grade Algebra II 5th Grade
1980-81 .02695301*** .15500636
(.01012379) (.13638222)
1990 .01213874 -.0415668
(.01468411) (.12876576)
2001 .01000397 -.06083326 -.0518645
(.01318996) (.05961745) (.0345013)
2007 .07830627*** .02394479 .1478395***
(.01960964) (.08020938) (.0348863)
2008 .08235301*** .24133456*** .1302555***
(.03550584) (.11245701) (.0357959)
Notes: There was not enough 5th grade certification scores in my data set to do an
attrition test for the recessions in 1980 and 1990.
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Table 29: Attrition 2
Value Added Certification Score
5th Grade Algebra II 5th Grade Algebra II
Recession -.08590634 -.08199557 -.08039573 -.15305409
(.06368004) (.07176308) (.0841072) (.15173938)
Value Added .01777684 .04515967
(.01249187) (.03650339)
Certification Test Score -.06149843 .04892467
(.04079742) (.08644482)
Notes: The first panel is a regression of the attrition variable on the recession dummy
variable for each group of teachers. The second panel is a regression of the attrition vari-
able on the Certification Score variable for each group of teachers. The third panel is a
regression of the attrition variable on the Value Added variable for each group of teachers.
Remember that the certification score teachers are a subset of my value added teachers.
See tables 9 and 10.
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Table 30: Balancing Test
Entire Sample
Black -.0085195**
(.0029208)
Hispanic -.0152657*
(.0055015)
Female -.005848**
(.0017987)
Sub-Sample
Black -.0042449
(.003082)
Hispanic -.005377
(.0058161)
Female -.0027925
(.0022543)
Notes: This is a regression of individual level observables on the treatment variable for
my labor market sorting regression. The first panel is my entire sample, which fails, and
the second excludes post recession variables, which passes.
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Table 31: Balancing Test
Student Control School Control
F score 0.87 0.95
Prob > F 0.5843 0.4414
Black .0202727 -.0176336
(.010194) (.0682675)
Hispanic .0188191 .0053445
(.0311497) (.0540049)
White .0119048 -.032867
(.01217) (.0508018)
Male -.0001716
(.0007364)
Learning Disabled .0007825
(.00486)
Limited English .0144246
(.0453632)
Reduced Lunch -.0009783 -.0195115
(.0226035) (.0268331)
Notes: This is a regression of Student and School level observables on the treatment
variable. School controls are the proportion of that type of student in that school, which is
only available for certain variables.
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